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A B S T R A C T
It has been long hypothesized that due to the inherent ambiguities of visual input
and the limitations of the visual system, vision is a form of “unconscious inference”
whereby the brain relies on assumptions (aka expectations) to interpret the external
world. This hypothesis has been recently formalized into Bayesian models of percep-
tion (the “Bayesian brain”) that represent these expectations as prior probabilities. In
this thesis, I focus on a particular kind of expectation that humans are thought to
possess – that objects in the world tend to be still or move slowly – known as the
“slow speed prior”. Through a combination of experimental and theoretical work, I
investigate how the speed prior is acquired and how it impacts motion perception.
The first part of my work consists of an experiment where subjects are exposed to
simple "training" stimuli moving more often at high speeds than at low speeds. By
subsequently testing the subjects with slow-moving stimuli of high uncertainty (low
contrast), I find that their perception gradually changes in a manner consistent with
the progressive acquisition of an expectation that favours progressively higher speeds.
Thus subjects appear to gradually internalize the speed statistics of the stimulus en-
semble over the duration of the experiment. I model these results using an existing
Bayesian model of motion perception that incorporates a speed prior with a peak
at zero, extending the model so that the mean gradually shifts away from zero. Al-
though the first experiment presents evidence for the plasticity of the speed prior,
the experimental paradigm and the constraints of the model limit the accuracy and
precision in the reconstruction of observers’ priors. To address these limitations, I
perform a different experiment where subjects compare the speed of moving grat-
ings of different contrasts. The new paradigm allows more precise measurements of
the contrast-dependent biases in perceived speed. Using a less constrained Bayesian
model, I extract the priors of subjects and find considerable interindividual variability.
Furthermore, noting that the Bayesian model cannot account for certain subtleties in
the data, I combine the model with a non-Bayesian, physiologically motivated model
of speed tuning of cortical neurons and show that the combination offers an improved
description of the data. Using the paradigm of the second experiment, I then explore
the role of visual experience on the form of the speed prior. By recruiting avid video
gamers (who are routinely exposed to high speeds) and nongamers of both sexes, I
study the differences in the prior among groups and find, surprisingly, that subjects’
speed priors depend more on gender than on gaming experience. In a final series of
experiments similar to the first, I also test subjects on variations of the trained stim-
ulus configuration – namely different orientations and motion directions. Subjects’
responses suggest that they are able to apply the changed prior to different orienta-
tions and, furthermore, that the changed prior persists for at least a week after the
end of the experiment. These results provide further support for the plasticity of the
speed prior but also suggest that the learned prior may be used only across similar
stimulus configurations, whereas in sufficiently different configurations or contexts a
“default” prior may be used instead.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Throughout its life, an animal is faced with uncertainty about the external environ-
ment. In the case of vision, the projection of a 3D physical stimulus onto the retina
most often results in a loss of information about the true properties of the stimulus,
i.e. there is inherent ambiguity in the information entering the brain. Thus it is of-
ten the case that multiple physical stimuli give rise to the same retinal image. For
example, an object forming an elliptical pattern on the retina may indeed have an
elliptical shape but it may also be a disc viewed with a slant (Figure 1). How does
the visual system “choose” whether to see an ellipse or a slanted disc?
Furthermore, even in the absence of external ambiguity, internal neural noise or
physical limitations of sensory organs, such as limitations in the optics of the eye or
in retinal resolution, may also result in information loss and prevent the brain from
detecting details in the visual scene that are necessary to disambiguate it.
Figure 1: An elliptical pattern forming on the retina can be either an ellipse viewed upright
or a circle viewed at an angle. (image adapted from Knill, 2007)
Confronted with these types of uncertainty, the brain must somehow make a guess
about the external world; that is, it has to estimate the identity, location and other
properties of the objects and processes that generate the sensory input. This estim-
ation may rely on sensory cues (from the same or different modalities) but also on
assumptions, or expectations, about the external world. Due to the fact that the brain
uses cues and expectations in order to infer the percept, perception has been charac-
terized as a form of “unconscious inference” – a hypothesis put forth by Helmholtz1
1 In contrast, forward inference refers to the computation of the 2D projection from the physical stimulus.
In visual perception, this amounted to the measurement of the stimulus. However, for the measurement
to be of any ecological value, there must be a one-to-one corresponce between the physical stimulus
1
1.1 perception as bayesian inference 2
as early as in 1867 (reprinted in von Helmholtz, 1962). According to the Helmholtzian
view, vision is an instance of inverse inference, whereby the visual system estimates
the true properties of a physical stimulus from its 2D projection on the retina, i.e.
inverts the process of the mapping of the stimulus onto the retina, with the help of
expectations about the properties of the stimulus.
1.1 perception as bayesian inference
Helmholtz’s view of perception as unconscious inference has seen a resurgence in
popularity in recent years in the form of the “Bayesian brain” hypothesis (Knill and
Pouget, 2004; Ma et al., 2006). According to this hypothesis, the brain combines sens-
ory input and prior expectations in a principled, probabilistically optimal2 way that
is akin to Bayesian inference (Kersten et al., 2004) – the method of inference that uses
Bayes’ rule to update the probability distribution of a hypothesis based on accumu-
lated evidence. In perception, the hypothesis is a particular property of the world
(call it S) whereas the accumulated evidence is the sensory input (call it I). As an
example, I could correspond to a matrix of light intensity (luminance) values at each
point of the visual field. In Bayesian statistics, the conditional probability of the input
given the state of the world P(I|S) is called the likelihood function. Inference amounts
to computing the posterior probability P(S|I) (or simply the posterior) of a property of




where P(S) is the prior probability of S (or simply the prior). P(S) represents mathem-
atically one’s expectations about what S might be prior to receiving any data. P(I|S)
and P(S) represent the observer’s knowledge about the statistical structure of the
world. This knowledge is called the generative model (Kersten et al., 2004; Vilares and
Kording, 2011). P(I) is the prior probability of the image; it does not depend on S
and serves as a normalizing factor, ensuring that the posterior sums to unity. Bayesian
and its projection. Helmholtz realized that in most cases in vision, such a one-to-one mapping does not
exist.
2 Biological and computational constraints often prohibit the implementation of a truly optimal solution,
in which case the brain will necessarily adopt a suboptimal strategy, such as an approximation. It
has been argued that the inferential processes of the brain are in some cases suboptimal and that this
suboptimality has been often misinterpreted as noise (Beck et al., 2012).
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inference is the mathematically optimal way of probabilistically combining sensory
input and expectations; an observer who uses Bayesian inference is thus called an
ideal observer.
The posterior contains all the necessary information to make inferences about S
by assigning a probability to each value of S. But what is the value that is actually
perceived? Bayesian Decision Theory provides a framework for answering this ques-
tion by defining a gain (or loss) function and choosing the percept (value of S) that
maximizes the expected gain (or minimizes the expected loss) over all stimuli. If the
goal of the animal is to have the fewest possible mismatches between perception and
reality, the value of S that achieves this (call it S∗) is simply the most probable value,
i.e. the mode of the posterior P(S|I) and is called the maximum a posteriori (MAP)
solution:
S∗ = arg max
S
P(S|I) (2)
The MAP solution is optimal under the above criterion of least mismatches; however,
it is not the only possibility. If, for example, the loss function is proportional to the
squared difference of the inferred and actual percept (S− S∗)2, which is a commonly
used statistical measure, it can be shown that the optimal solution is not the mode
but the mean of the posterior (which is generally different to the mode for skewed or
multimodal distributions).
Taking either the mode or the mean of the posterior is a deterministic solution; for
a given posterior, S∗ is always the same. In perceptual experiments, however, there
is very often trial-to-trial variability in subjects’ responses: repeated presentations of
the same stimulus do not lead to identical percepts every time. This variability has
generally been modelled in two ways.
One way is to assume that perception and/or responses are corrupted by noise.
The first type of noise, perceptual noise, could be in the image itself or in the neural
activity of the visual system. Signal Detection Theory (SDT), a framework used to
explain perceptual detection and discrimination tasks, assumes that the variability
in subject responses comes from perceptual variability due to noise in the signal (i.e.
the stimulus) and its sensory representations in the brain. Response noise, usually
referred to as decision noise, is an additional source of noise between perception and
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response - for example, neural noise in motor areas of the brain that introduces vari-
ability in reporting what was seen, even when the percept itself is noiseless (Mamas-
sian et al., 2002). It has been argued that the variability observed in many perceptual
experiments cannot be explained by SDT alone and instead requires the addition of
decision noise (Mueller and Weidemann, 2008), and the concept of decision noise has
been used in Bayesian models of perception to explain trial-to-trial variability (Weiss
et al., 2002).
Another way to model trial-to-trial variability is to assume a stochastic rule for
choosing S∗. The most popular approach is probability matching whereby S∗ is simply
a sample from the posterior. Thus across trials, the relative frequency of a particular
percept is equal to its posterior probability. It can be shown that probability matching
is not an optimal strategy under the standard loss criteria discussed above. However,
the optimality of a decision rule based on the mode or the mean of the posterior
rests on the assumption that the posterior is correct or that the environment is static;
when either of these is not true, probability matching can be more useful because
it increases exploratory behaviour and provides opportunity for learning (Mamas-
sian et al., 2002; Wozny et al., 2010; Battaglia et al., 2011). Probability matching and
more generally posterior sampling has also been proposed as a mechanism to explain
multistable perception (Gershman et al., 2012), whereby an ambiguous image results
in two (or more) interpretations that spontaneously alternate in time. For example,
looking at Figure 2, right, we might see a vase at one time but two opposing faces at
another time.
Two things should be noted regarding the strategies for choosing S∗. First, a MAP
solution may be the only viable approach when the entire posterior cannot be well
approximated, i.e. it may be possible to infer the most likely percept but not the
probabilities for all possible percepts. Second, drawing from machine learning literat-
ure, some authors have suggested a smooth transition between MAP and probability
matching by means of exponentiation of the posterior (Battaglia et al., 2011): raising
the posterior to the power of k > 1 makes the posterior sharper. By increasing k the
posterior approaches a delta function centred at the mode and thus sampling from
that posterior is simply the MAP solution. Posterior sampling in the brain may then
be a common strategy at various levels of perception and cognition and the brain
1.2 overview of thesis 5
may adjust the value of the exponent k to switch from probability matching to MAP
and everything in between (Moreno-Bote et al., 2011).
1.2 overview of thesis
In this thesis I ask whether expectations about the speed of moving objects (assumed
long-term and possibly hardwired) can be changed and, by using Bayesian models
that incorporate this expectation in the form of a prior probability on speed, examine
the temporal dynamics, stability and specificity of the changing prior. In chapter 2,
I review the existing literature on the types, role and adaptability of priors in visual
perception and then focus on previous theoretical and experimental work on the
speed prior. In chapter 3, I describe a motion perception experiment that provides
evidence for the plasticity of the speed prior and extend an existing Bayesian model,
endowing it with a prior that changes to accommodate the speed statistics of the
experimental environment. In chapter 4, I investigate the potential for change of the
speed prior using a paradigm that allows a precise reconstruction of the prior from
psychophysical data, uncovering a novel effect of contrast on perceived speed in the
process. In chapter 5, I ask whether differences in everyday visual experience or
gender can account for the differences in speed priors and the associated perceptual
biases observed in humans. In chapter 6, I examine how generalizable or context-
specific the speed prior is and whether it is robust in time. Finally, in chapter 7 I put
my experimental and theoretical work in perspective and discuss its implications, its
limitations and the prospect of unification of Bayesian models with physiologically
grounded principles of processing of visual motion.
2
B A C K G R O U N D A N D R E S E A R C H M O T I VAT I O N
2.1 expectations in perception
2.1.1 Types of expectations
Perceptual expectations refer to our prior beliefs about properties of the external
world when interpreting sensory input. These beliefs might come from spatiotem-
porally confined cues that help disambiguate a scene. In Figure 2, the ambiguous
“Rubin’s vase” shown in the middle panel is very likely to be interpreted as two faces
if one’s gaze is closer to the left panel (or if the right panel is not attended) and as a
vase if one’s gaze is closer to the right panel because of the spatial proximity of the
ambiguous image to the unambiguous versions. The same effect would be observed
with temporal proximity, such as when Rubin’s vase is presented shortly after the
unambiguous image of a vase or two faces. Such expectations develop immediately
and affect mostly the currently processed sensory input. This kind of expectations,
induced by cues that are local in space or time and have immediate and short-term
effects, have been recently dubbed “contextual expectations” (Seriès and Seitz, 2013).
There are various types of contextual expectations. In a psychophysical experiment
conducted by Sekuler and Ball (1977), expectations were in the form of explicitly
given information regarding the possible directions of motion of a random-dot stim-
ulus. The stimulus moved either upward or rightward and observers had to guess
which trials contained a stimulus and which did not but were told which of the
two directions would be presented if the stimulus did appear in a trial (the stimulus
contrast was low so that its detection was challenging). In another psychophysical
experiment (Haijiang et al., 2006), expectations were formed via Pavlovian condition-
ing, i.e. association between the sense of rotation of an object, as suggested by stereo
and occlusion cues, and a signal (which could be a sound or the screen position of
the stimulus). When the sense of rotation was later made ambiguous by removing the
6
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stereo and occlusion cues, subjects’ perception of sense depended on the presence of
the signal.
Figure 2: Rubin’s vase. The black-and-white image in the middle can be seen as a black vase
or as two opposing white faces. The unambiguous images on the left and right
provide the context that primes the visual system to choose one of the interpreta-
tions for the ambiguous image.
Contextual expectations are not the only kind of expectations; another kind, con-
ceptually more akin to Bayesian priors, are expectations based on general, or prior,
knowledge about the world. Seriès and Seitz (2013) call these structural expectations.
The expectation that shapes are commonly isotropic (Knill, 1998, 2007) is one such
example: when humans see an elliptical pattern such as that of Figure 1, they as-
sume that it is a circle viewed at a slant rather than an ellipse because circles are
isotropic. Another example of a structural expectation is that light comes from above
(or perhaps from above-left; Mamassian and Goutcher, 2001). The light-from-above
prior is used by humans (Ramachandran, 1988; Mamassian and Landy, 2001; Adams
et al., 2004) as well as other animals (Sun and Perona, 1998) when inferring the prop-
erties of an object from its apparent shading. In shape-from-shading judgements, as
well as in figure-ground separation tasks, another expectation also influences percep-
tion – that objects tend to be convex rather than concave (Kanizsa and Gerbino, 1976;
Adams and Mamassian, 2004; Peterson and Salvagio, 2008). Figure 3B is interpreted
by humans as a set of bumps instead of dents whereas C is typically interpreted as
a set of black objects in white background (and not vice versa) because under this
interpretation the objects are convex. A convexity prior seems to exist not just for
objects within a scene (e.g. bumps on a surface) but also for the entire surface itself:
subjects are better at local shape discrimination when the surface is globally convex
rather than concave (Langer and Bulthoff, 2001). A related, recently reported expect-
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ation is that depth (distance between figure and ground) is greater when the figure
is convex rather than concave. This results in an increase in perceived depth in the
case of convex figures given the same binocular disparity (Burge et al., 2010). Other
examples of expectations are that objects tend to be viewed from above (Mamas-
sian and Landy, 1998); that objects are at a distance of 2-4 m from ourselves (specific
distance tendency, Gogel, 1965; Owens and Leibowitz, 1976); that objects in nearby ra-
dial directions are at the same distance from ourselves (equidistance tendency, Gogel,
1965); that cardinal (horizontal and vertical) orientations are more likely than oblique
orientations (Tomassini et al., 2010; Girshick et al., 2011); and that people’s gaze is
directed towards us (Mareschal et al., 2013). The last example that I mention here is
the expectation that has been the subject of my doctoral research - that objects in the
world tend to move slowly or be still. In Bayesian models of motion perception, this
is typically referred to as the slow speed prior (Weiss and Adelson, 1998; Weiss et al.,
2002; Hürlimann et al., 2002; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Montagnini et al., 2007;
Bogadhi et al., 2011; Hedges et al., 2011).
The distinction between contextual and structural expectations is not always clear-
cut. For example, when you see a dark, pistol-shaped object in the bathroom after
you’ve taken off your glasses and your vision is blurred, you will likely see that ob-
ject as a hairdryer (Figure 3C). The exact same shape seen in a workshop will be
perceived as a drill. The context, bathroom sink vs workbench, helps disambiguate
the object - a contextual expectation. However, this disambiguation relies on prior
knowledge that hair dryers are more common in bathrooms and drills are more com-
mon in workshops; these are structural expectations. For the remainder of this thesis,
structural expectations will be referred to simply as “expectations” whereas contex-
tual expectations will be always qualified as such. In a Bayesian context, (structural)
expectations will be referred to as “priors”.
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Figure 3: A, interplay between contextual and structural expectations. The black object on the
left is typically perceived as a hair dryer because it has a pistol-like shape (struc-
tural expectation), it appears to be in a bathroom (contextual expectation) and we
know that hair dryers are typically found in bathrooms (structural expectation) . The
identical-looking black object on the right is perceived as a drill since the context
implies that the scene is a workshop (image adapted from Bar, 2004). B, convexity
expectation for shape-from-shading. Shaded circles are most often seen as bumps il-
luminated from the right instead of dents illuminated from the left (image adapted
from Adams, 2007). C, convexity expectation for figure-ground separation. Black
regions are seen as convex objects in a white background more often than white
regions being seen as concave objects in a black background (image adapted from
Peterson and Salvagio, 2008).
2.1.2 Impact of expectations
Expectations help us infer the state of the environment (or aspects of interest of that
state, such as particular objects) in the face of uncertainty. In the “bathroom sink vs
workbench” example, expectations help disambiguate the dark object in the middle
of each image in Figure 3. In some cases, multiple expectations must be employed to
disambiguate a scene and perception is the result of the interaction of these expect-
ations (Mamassian and Landy, 2001). Mamassian and Landy (1998) found that the
perceived curvatures of a family of 3D-interpretable line drawings can be explained
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under three types of expectations: that surfaces tend to be convex, that surface con-
tours are aligned with the principal lines of curvature and that objects are viewed
from above. Apart from aiding with object identification or shape judgements, ex-
pectations can impact perception in several other ways. For example, in the afore-
mentioned study by Sekuler and Ball (1977), subjects were better and faster at de-
tecting the presence of the stimulus at the expected directions. Similar improvements
in detection performance and reaction times at expected motion directions were ob-
served by Chalk et al. (2010) and improvements in luminance detection, brightness
discrimination, orientation discrimination and form discrimination were observed by
Downing (1988) at the spatial location where stimuli were expected to appear.
Sometimes, however, expectations can result in biased or illusory perception. In
some cases, expectations about a particular measurable property influence the per-
ceived magnitude of that property. For example, the aforementioned expectation of
slow speeds is thought to result in underestimation of the speed of low-contrast stim-
uli (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006), which explains, among other things, why drivers
tend to drive faster in foggy conditions in real (Snowden et al., 1998) and simulated
(Horswill and Plooy, 2008) environments. Expectations about one property can even
influence the perception of another property: Wallach observed that a line moving
behind a circular aperture, with its endpoints concealed such that its true direction
cannot be recovered (Figure 4), always appears to move perpendicularly to its orient-
ation. He hypothesized that the reason for this remarkably universal perception is an
innate preference of the visual system for slow speeds and the fact that the perpen-
dicular direction is the one corresponding to the slowest speed compatible with the
retinal image sequence1. Similarly, Weiss et al. (2002) showed that a Bayesian model
incorporating a slow speed prior can explain, among other things, the difference in
perceived direction between rhombus-shaped moving stimuli of different contrasts
(see 2.2.3 for a detailed discussion).
1 Wallach published his findings, originally in his doctoral thesis, in German, as a paper in the journal
Psychologische Forschung in 1935. Although Wallach later translated a small part of his work in English,
it was not until 60 years later that the entire paper was translated by Wuerger et al. (1996).
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Figure 4: The aperture problem: the direction of motion of a line visible only through the
green circle is ambiguous, as only the motion component normal to the line (blue
arrow) is visible. True motion is upward (orange arrow) but the motion component
parallel to the line is not visible. Humans invariably perceive the direction to be that
of the normal component (image adapted from Pei et al., 2008)
2.1.3 Expectations and environmental statistics
If our perceptual systems are to perform well, that is, if the interpretation of an
ambiguous or noisy scene is to match the real world as closely as possible, our ex-
pectations will need to accurately reflect the structure of the world. In Bayesian terms,
this means that our priors must closely approximate the statistics of the environment.
Using the previous “bathroom sink vs workbench” example, we need to have a prior
that favours the presence of drills in workshops. If that were not the case, we might
interpret the object in the workshop as a hair dryer, which would lead to an incorrect
inference more often than not because, statistically speaking, drills are more common
in workshops that hair dryers are.
Our visual input - the images forming on the retina - although very varied, is
only a small subset of the entire possible image space. Natural images are highly re-
dundant, containing many statistical regularities that the visual system may exploit
to make inferences about the world (Simoncelli, 2003; Geisler, 2008). If expectations
are to facilitate vision, they should approximate environmental statistics and, indeed,
there is considerable evidence that in many cases they do. Even certain perceptual bi-
ases are thought to be byproducts of expectations that match natural scene statistics.
Tomassini et al. (2010) found that the magnitude of the perceptual bias of subjects
judging the orientation of elongated stimuli (Gabor patches) was proportional to
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the uncertainty in orientation judgements. The bias was always towards the cardinal
orientations (vertical and horizontal), indicating a tendency to expect cardinal orient-
ations in the world. This expectation is in accord with the distribution of orientations
in natural scenes (Coppola et al., 1998; Girshick et al., 2011). Girshick et al. (2011)
formalized this expectation as a prior on orientation in a Bayesian model of percep-
tion and, using a previously developed method of extracting the prior from psycho-
physical data (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006), found that subjects’ priors matched the
distribution of orientations in natural images to a considerable degree. Further evid-
ence for a match between expectations and natural scene statistics comes from Yang
and Purves (2003). The authors used laser range scanning to measure the distances of
all unoccluded points in a variety of natural scenes. They found that the distribution
of distances has a peak at about 3 m, which is in the middle of the range of 2-4 m
found in studies on the specific distance tendency (see 2.1.1) by Gogel (1965) and
Owens and Leibowitz (1976). Another example comes from Geisler and Perry (2009),
who measured the pairwise statistics of edge elements from contours found in nat-
ural images (Figure 5). They found that the way humans group edge elements of
occluded contours matches the performance of an ideal observer Bayesian model, i.e.
a model with a prior reflecting the statistics of the natural image database. This sug-
gests that perceptual mechanisms of contour grouping are closely related to natural
image statistics. Finally, the influence of the convexity expectation in figure-ground
separation (Kanizsa and Gerbino, 1976; Peterson and Salvagio, 2008) may also have a
basis in natural scene statistics. Burge et al. (2010) found that subjects expect greater
distances between convex figures and background than between concave ones and
background. These expectations were in accord with the statistics of a collection of
luminance and range images obtained from indoor and outdoor scenes.
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Figure 5: Contour locations and contour groups for small example patches from three differ-
ent natural images. The contour locations and contrast polarities were detected by
an automatic algorithm. The contour groups were obtained by hand segmentation.
The direction of the arrows in the bottom images indicates the contrast polarity
of the contour; the different colours represent different groups - note that because
colours are randomly selected from a colour palette, different groups may have a
similar colour (image and caption adapted from Geisler and Perry, 2009).
Research on the statistical structure of time-varying images is scarcer than research
on static images. There are relatively few time-varying image databases, compared to
static image databases and, moreover, inferring a distribution of object speeds from
image sequences is complicated by the fact that retinal motion (the motion of pat-
terns forming on the retina) does not correspond to object motion in a trivial way.
One problem is that object speed can be inferred from retinal speed (the rate of move-
ment of an object’s projection on the retina) only if the distance of the object from
the observer is known. Another problem is that retinal motion can be produced both
by the independent motion of objects in the view field and by self-motion. In the
case of self-motion, a further complication is that properties of motion signals are not
independent of the position in the view field (Zanker and Zeil, 2005). For example,
during self-motion such as walking or driving, radial motion flow in the periphery
is greater than near the centre of view (foveal and parafoveal motion) and objects
in the periphery appear to move centrifugally. The combination of object and self-
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motion determine the statistics of retinal motion fields, i.e the optical flow. A number
of studies have looked at the statistics of optical flow fields by analyzing synthetic
but realistic flow fields generated via simulated 3D camera motion through natural
images that contain depth information. Calow and Lappe (2007) analyzed the stat-
istics of flow fields in several retinal locations and found that the local distributions
of speeds are to a good approximation log-normal. Interestingly, Zhang et al. (2013)
showed that observers’ peripheral vision had a strong centrifugal bias (static and
even slow centripetally moving gratings presented briefly in the periphery appeared
to move centrifugally). These biases were well accounted for by a Bayesian model
with a speed prior that favoured centrifugal motion. Roth and Black (2005) found
that, in synthetic data of optical flow generated using a range image database and
camera motion simulation, the distribution of speeds peaks at zero (i.e. most points
in the camera frame field have zero flow) and falls off with speed as a Laplace distri-
bution, exhibiting significantly heavy tails. Dong and Atick (1995) adopted a simpler
approach, analyzing a variety of video clips for certain simple statistical regularities
and showing that the power spectrum of the clips was consistent with a variety of
speed distributions p(v) – in other words, their image analysis cannot fully constrain
p(v). However, they noted that a distribution that follows an inverse power law, i.e.





(with vo and n as positive constants) leads to an analytical formula for the power
spectrum function that matches well the measured power spectra of their natural
image database. Equation 3 is a decreasing function of speed and thus a prior of this
form would favour slow speeds.
Thus the work of Dong and Atick (1995), Roth and Black (2005) and Calow and
Lappe (2007) suggests that a slow speed prior is consistent with natural scene statist-
ics. As we saw in 2.1.1, Weiss et al. (2002) and Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) suggest
that human observers possess such a prior. The model of Weiss et al. (2002) that in-
corporates a parametric slow speed prior (Gaussian centred at zero speed) is able
to account for a wide variety of perceptual phenomena. Moreover, Stocker and Si-
moncelli (2006), by using a non-parametric approach to reverse-engineer the speed
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prior from psychophysical data, found that observers’ priors favoured slow speeds.
Interestingly, the priors closely matched an inverse power law, exhibiting significantly
heavier tails than a Gaussian. The two models are discussed in more detail in 2.2.3.2.
2.2 outstanding questions and research motivation
While expectations have been studied for more than a century, the formalization of
expectations as priors in Bayesian models of perception is relatively recent. Although
by now there is a considerable body of theoretical work on Bayesian models that ac-
count for a wealth of perceptual data from human and non-human observers, there
are several outstanding questions. In this section I lay out the questions that motiv-
ated my doctoral research, as well as any relevant theoretical and experimental work.
2.2.1 Can long-term priors be changed?
The modification of perceptual expectations can be achieved in a variety of ways. In
2.1.1 I gave two examples of how contextual expectations can be rapidly changed.
Structural expectations on the other hand are presumably learned either through ex-
perience, by exposure to the statistics of the environment (Simoncelli, 2003; Geisler,
2008), or are innate, hardwired in the brain by evolution. Certain structural expect-
ations can be quickly learned from stimulus statistics in experimental setups. Chalk
et al. (2010) presented subjects with random-dot stimuli moving in certain two dir-
ections more often than in others. Subjects were asked to report whether they saw
motion and what the direction was. After minutes of exposure to the stimulus en-
semble, subjects’ responses indicated a bias towards the two frequent directions. Fur-
thermore, in trials where subjects reported seeing motion when there wasn’t any (a
form of hallucination), the perceived motion was in the two frequent directions.
Although direction expectations are structural, there is no evidence, to my know-
ledge, to suggest that certain motion directions in natural environments are more
common than others. Downward motion due to gravity and horizontal motion due
to locomotion on flat ground could plausibly be more common than other directions
in nature; however, the complications mentioned in 2.1.3 (briefly, the fact that retinal
motion does not correspond to object motion in a simple way), the statistics of retinal
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motion directions are likely very different from the statistics of motion in nature with
respect to any fixed frame of reference. In absence of environmental regularities that
may have shaped the prior to favour certain directions more than others, the brain
may be more likely to adapt to the statistics of an experimental stimulus ensemble.
But is it possible to change long-term priors that have been shaped according to the
statistics of natural scenes, either during development or by evolution? Adams et al.
(2004) answered this question affirmatively in the case of the light-from-above prior.
They presented subjects with shaded hemispheres2 at a variety of orientations and
ask them to report whether they are bumps (convex) or dents (concave). Based on
their responses, they inferred that the initial light prior of all subjects was roughly
overhead. They subsequently exposed subjects to similar stimuli in a 1.5-hour session
but this time giving them haptic (active touch) feedback on whether the hemispheres
were bumps or dents. Crucially, however, the shading of the hemispheres and the
haptic feedback were consistent with a light direction that deviated ±30◦ from over-
head. When the subjects where then tested (without haptic feedback), their responses
had changed: the 30◦ and −30◦ groups had shifted the mode of their priors by 9◦ and
−13◦ on average, respectively. Thus, with just 1.5 hours of training, humans were
able to update their light-from-above prior. Subsequent research by the same group
confirmed the plasticity of this prior (Adams et al., 2010). Interestingly, the light-from-
above prior does not seem to be mutable in chickens, as revealed by an experiment
with chickens reared in an environment illuminated from below (Hershberger, 1970).
To my knowledge, the only other attempt at changing a long-term prior is the work
of Knill (2007). The prior in question is that objects tend to be isotropic, so that, for
example, circles are more common than ellipses in the world (see also Figure 1). This
tendency for isotropy is assumed to reflect environmental statistics, although to date
this has not been examined directly. Under the assumption of isotropy, the apparent
aspect ratio (AR) of a surface serves as a cue to slant (referred to as foreshortening
cue): if the surface is assumed to be circular, the deviation of AR from 1 is propor-
tional to slant. In the experiments of Knill (2007), subjects were asked to judge the
slant of elliptical surfaces presented on a screen. Subjects were provided with ste-
reo glasses so that stereoscopic cues to depth were available to them. The experiment
was set up in a way that the foreshortening cues conflicted with the stereoscopic cues:
2 The stimuli in Adams et al. (2004) were similar to the ones in Figure 6, B: the hemispheres there can be
seen as bumps illuminated from the right or as dents illuminated from the left.
2.2 outstanding questions and research motivation 17
the stereoscopic cues were always in perfect agreement with the true magnitude of
surface slant, which was indicated to the subjects at the end of each trial by haptic
feedback, whereas the foreshortening cues were less correlated with true slant. Sub-
jects completed 5-7 one-hour sessions (one per day) of exposure to two different
stimulus ensembles. The first ensemble consisted of ellipses with ARs very close to
1 whereas the second consisted of ellipses of random ARs (and thus circles, which
have an AR of 1, were no more common than ellipses with AR 6= 1). In the course
of the experiment, subjects exposed to the second ensemble relied progressively less
on the foreshortening cues and more on the stereoscopic cues, which implies that
they started seeing elliptical patterns more often as ellipses of random ARs (and less
often as slanted circles). This adaptation was not seen in subjects exposed to the first
stimulus ensemble: the weights subjects gave to the two cues did not change across
sessions. According to the author, this is indirect evidence that subjects exposed to a
large proportion of irregular (anisotropic) shapes changed their assumptions about
regularity and no longer assumed that surfaces are mostly circular. In the Bayesian
model of Knill (2007), the prior is a mixture of a component where AR is equal to 1
(Dirac delta function) and a component where AR is normally distributed. Learning
consisted of changing the mixing coefficient to favour the second component more. In-
terestingly, results where similar when haptic feedback was omitted but the disparity
between the two cues was large (much larger than the disparities in the initial experi-
ment). This suggests that when the conflict between foreshortening and stereoscopic
cues is large enough, the visual system will gradually downweight the less reliable
– that is, the foreshortening – cue (as stereoscopic cues are more reliable), even in
the absence of feedback. Overall, the work of Knill (2007) suggests that subjects are
able to adapt to the AR statistics of the world, either via explicit (with feedback) or
implicit learning.
2.2.2 How specific are priors?
Although the research is limited, we saw that some priors appear to be mutable by
means of “statistical learning” - exposure to unambiguous (or disambiguated with
feedback) stimuli with distributions different from the prior. Do the changed priors
have an effect only when the visual environment is identical or sufficiently similar to
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the environment that drove the change or can the new priors generalize to different
circumstances? Consider the aforementioned direction expectations formed by expos-
ure to the random-dot stimulus ensemble of Chalk et al. (2010) - would these carry
over to random-dot stimuli of different colour or even to different stimuli altogether?
Gekas et al. (2013) provided clues to the answer by performing a very similar exper-
iment to that of Chalk et al. (2010) but using two differently coloured random-dot
ensembles, red and green, each with its own distribution of motion directions. The
authors found that subjects applied the learned prior from the green ensemble to the
estimates for the red ensemble (showing similar biases as in Chalk et al., 2010) but
only if there was nothing to learn for the latter, i.e. only when the distribution of the
red ensemble was uniform. On the contrary, if both distributions were non-uniform,
subjects appeared to be able to learn two priors and apply each to the respective en-
semble. Therefore Gekas et al. (2013) showed that learned priors exert their influence
on similar but not identical stimulus ensembles to the ones that shaped the priors.
Furthermore, when two stimulus ensembles have different and non-uniform statist-
ics, humans are flexible enough to employ separate priors. A case for the ability of
humans to maintain different priors for similar stimuli was also made by Seydell
et al. (2010) who revisited the prior for isotropy of shapes (Knill, 2007, see above).
The authors performed a series of experiments. In the first, they used two groups
of stimulus shapes (ellipses and diamonds) giving each group a different distribu-
tion of aspect ratios. In the second experiment, the stimuli in the two groups had
the same shape (elliptical) but they had different colours (pink and purple). Subjects
were able to learn separate distributions of aspect ratios (evidenced by the different
changes in the weights they gave to stereoscopic cues to slant, as in Knill, 2007) for
each shape. Interestingly, however, their isotropy prior was shared between the two
colour groups - learning of the prior by exposure to the pink stimuli generalized to
the purple stimuli. Taken together, the results of Gekas et al. (2013) and Seydell et al.
(2010) suggest that a single prior can be used for stimuli of different colour, although
the circumstances under which this happens are not yet fully known.
Can long-term expectations also generalize across dimensions such as task or stim-
ulus type? The literature addressing this question is limited and most investigations
have focused on the light-from-above prior. Adams et al. (2004), who showed that
the light-from-above prior can be changed, also presented evidence that the same
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light-from-above prior applies to different tasks and stimuli. The stimuli that subjects
were exposed to were groups of shaded hemispheres. However, in order to exclude
the possibility that the subjects learned a direct relationship between shape and shad-
ing or used a cognitive strategy instead of changing their light-from-above prior, the
authors tested the subjects with a different stimulus type that consisted of an orange
square flanked by two grey areas. By asking subjects to compare the brightness of the
two grey areas at various orientations of the stimulus, the authors found a difference
between groups that had learned two different illumination direction distributions
(both different from their baseline distribution) during training. This difference sug-
gested that there was a single prior for illumination directions that subjects changed
and then applied to a different stimulus and task. Further evidence that there is a
single light prior for each subject that applies to all tasks and stimuli was provided
by Adams (2007). There was substantial variability in the light prior across subjects
(several degrees on either side of the vertical) but approximately the same prior for
each subject applied for three different tasks - shape from shading, visual search and
reflectance (Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Examples of stimuli used in the three experiments of Adams (2007) that measure
the “light-from-above” prior. A, shape task: observers usually see the top left object
as concave and the others as convex, consistent with the “light-from-above” prior.
B, visual search: target detection is relatively difficult until the figure is rotated by
90◦. C, reflectance task: the left object is perceived as a homogeneous object lit from
above, whereas the right object appears to have a darker upper surface, consistent
with overhead lighting. (Image adapted from Adams, 2007)
Although in most investigations the light-from-above prior appears to be shared
across various tasks and stimuli, there is evidence that observers can develop context-
specific light priors under certain circumstances. Kerrigan and Adams (2013) per-
formed an experiment similar to the first experiment of Adams et al. (2004) (modi-
fication of the light-from-above prior with a shape-from-shading task) but with two
distinct stimulus sets, one where the illumination was green and another where it
was red. The two sets also differed in the distributions of lighting direction, with the
red-light set having a distribution favouring overhead lighting and the green-light
set having a distribution that favoured a direction 10◦ away from overhead. Subjects
managed to learn the two different distributions and apply them to the appropriate
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context. Interestingly, the amount of learning was greater when the two sets were
presented to the subjects in an intermingled fashion rather than one set after the
other.
Other priors may also be specific. Indirect clues that the prior for isotropy of shapes
is specific to task and/or stimulus properties can be found in the results of Knill
(2007), who noted that changes in cue weights (reflecting changes in the isotropy
prior) were monotonic across experimental sessions: the prior did not show any re-
adaptation effects from session to session, even though the sessions were on separate
days and subjects were exposed to the regularities of the world in the meantime.
According to the author, this suggests that subjects learned a context-specific prior.
Lack of re-adaptation of a learned prior was also noted by Adams et al. (2010) in
the case of the light-from-above prior. Using the same stimulus (shaded hemispheres)
as in a previous investigation (Adams et al., 2004), the authors repeatedly tested their
subjects over the next days after the end of the training procedure. They found that
learned changes in the interpretation of shading, and thus in the light-from-above
prior, persisted for at least four days - further evidence that the learned prior was
context-specific and thus did not re-adapt during everyday life.
2.2.3 Research focus: speed prior
From the above it has become clear that research on the modification of long-term
priors via statistical learning is limited to a handful of cases. The light-from-above
prior is the prior that has received the majority of attention in literature. However,
there is another prior that is assumed to be long-term and appears to underlie a
number of diverse, well-studied perceptual phenomena but for which the questions
in 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 have not been addressed: the slow speed prior. Before laying out
the unexplored aspects of this prior that are addressed in this thesis, I summarize the
effects of the slow speed prior on perception.
2.2.3.1 Effects of the slow speed prior on perception
A prior favouring slow speeds has been postulated as an explanation for a variety
of perceptual phenomena, including certain visual illusions and biases. One of the
earliest known effects attributed to the slow speed prior is described in 2.1.2 as the
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universal way that humans solve the aperture problem. A related illusion that can
also be accounted for by a Bayesian model with a slow speed prior (Weiss and Ad-
elson, 1998) is the “barberpole effect”: a diagonally striped pole rotating around its
vertical axis (horizontally) appears as though its stripes are moving in the direction of
its vertical axis. Another effect attributed to this prior by a number of authors (Heeger
and Simoncelli, 1993; Weiss and Adelson, 1998; Weiss et al., 2002; Hürlimann et al.,
2002; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006) is the “Thompson effect” (Thompson, 1982; Stone
and Thompson, 1992; Hawken et al., 1994; Hürlimann et al., 2002) – the decrease in
perceived speed of a moving stimulus when its contrast (the difference in luminance
between the brightest and darkest parts of the image) decreases – although other au-
thors have suggested alternative, non-Bayesian explanations (Thompson et al., 2006).
The Bayesian explanation of the effect of contrast on perceived speed is as follows:
given the noisy nature of eye optics and of neural activity, at low contrasts the signal-
to-noise ratio is lower than it is at high contrasts, i.e. at low contrasts the stimulus is
less salient. This means that the speed measurements that the visual system performs
are more noisy at low contrasts, which is reflected by a broader (higher-variance) like-
lihood function. According to Bayes rule (Equation 1), the prior, which is multiplied
by the likelihood to give the posterior, will thus have a greater influence on the pos-
terior than at high contrasts, where the likelihood is sharper. Since the perceived
speed is assumed to be determined by the posterior, if the prior favours slow speeds
it follows that perceived speed will be lower at low contrasts (Figure 7). A real-world
manifestation of the Thompson effect is the well-documented fact that drivers speed
up in the fog (Snowden et al., 1998). It should be noted that contrast is not the only
factor that can affect uncertainty. Short duration of motion can have a similar effect
to low contrast, in terms of increasing uncertainty, by broadening the temporal fre-
quency spectrum (Derrington and Goddard, 1989). Zhang et al. (2013) used stimulus
duration as a way of manipulating uncertainty in perceived speed, noting that it has
a similar effect to contrast but avoids certain complications that arise from nonlin-
ear effects of contrast changes on motion discrimination. These effects stem from
contrast-dependent changes in spatial suppression (Tadin et al., 2003).
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Figure 7: Illustration of a Bayesian estimator accounting for contrast-induced biases in speed
perception. A, a stimulus with high contrast leads to relatively precise measure-
ments and thus a narrow likelihood. Multiplication by a prior probability for low
speeds induces only a small shift of the posterior relative to the likelihood. B, a low-
contrast stimulus is assumed to produce noisier measurements and thus a broader
likelihood. Multiplication by the same prior induces a larger shift and thus the
low-contrast stimulus is typically perceived as moving slower. (Image adapted from
Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006)
In the case of motion in two dimensions, where the velocity (speed and direction)
must be estimated, the slow speed prior may affect not only the perceived speed but
also the perceived direction. In certain types of stimuli such as plaids (superposition
of moving gratings), contrast has been found to influence perceived direction (Stone
et al., 1990; Yo and Wilson, 1992; Burke and Wenderoth, 1993; Hedges et al., 2011). For
these stimuli, models incorporating preferences – either as Bayesian priors (Weiss
et al., 2002; Hedges et al., 2011) or as constraints/regularization factors (Farid and
Simoncelli, 1994; Langley, 1999) – for slow speeds and coherent motion have provided
good descriptions of psychophysical data. In the Bayesian model of Weiss et al. (2002),
the speed of a rigidly translating stimulus is determined by the integration of local
motion signals under the assumptions of measurement noise and a prior that favours
slow speeds. The model of Weiss et al. (2002) also accounts for the directional biases
that have been observed regarding the motion of lines that are unoccluded (their
terminators are visible, cf aperture problem) but their contrast is low. A spectacular
instance of the influence of contrast on perceived direction that can be explained by
assuming a slow speed prior is the rhombus illusion reported by Weiss et al. (2002)
(Figure 8): a thin, high-contrast rhombus that moves horizontally appears to move
in its true direction whereas the same rhombus at a low contrast appears to move
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diagonally. Weiss et al. (2002) make a convincing case that all these perceptual biases
and illusions are actually the result a probabilistically optimal combination of noisy
image measurements with a prior for slow speeds, which seems to be ecologically
motivated.
Figure 8: Influence of contrast on the perceived direction of a horizontally moving rhombus.
Probabilities are plotted in velocity space: the coordinates of each point represent the
magnitude of the horizontal and vertical component of the velocity at a particular
image location whereas the brightness of the point is proportional to the probability
of the corresponding velocity. A, with a high-contrast rhombus the signal-to-noise
ratio of the two local measurements (only two are shown for clarity) is high and thus
the likelihood in velocity space is sharp, tightly concentrated around a straight line,
and dominates the prior, which is broader. The resulting posterior is much more
similar to the likelihood and favours the veridical direction. B, with a low-contrast
rhombus, the constraint line of the likelihood is fuzzy, i.e. the likelihood is broad
and the prior exerts greater influence on the posterior, resulting in an posterior that
favours an oblique direction. (Image adapted from Weiss et al., 2002)
The slow speed prior has been suggested as the underlying mechanism for certain
biases in 3D motion perception as well. Various studies have established that observ-
ers overestimate angular trajectories of objects on a collision course with their head,
reporting instead that the object will miss them (Peper et al., 1994; Harris and Dean,
2003; Welchman et al., 2004; Gray et al., 2006). One of the groups that reported this
bias showed in a subsequent study (Welchman et al., 2008) that a Bayesian model
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of motion perception including a slow speed prior – similar to the prior reverse-
engineered by Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) from human psychophysical data – was
able to account for the perceptual biases in 3D motion.
The slow speed prior has even been invoked to explain phenomena in other mod-
alities, such as the cutaneous rabbit illusion, whereby two taps at a particular skin
location followed quickly by two taps at another skin location are perceived as a
series of taps, two out of which are felt in locations in-between the two veridical
ones (Goldreich and Tong, 2013). The authors propose a Bayesian model of motion
perception that includes both prediction and postdiction. Under the assumption that
the tactile stimuli originate from a single moving object (a “cutaneous rabbit”), the
illusory perception results from predicting and postdicting the distances that the ob-
ject covers between successive taps, which should be minimal during the perceived
inter-stimulus interval due to the slow speed prior.
2.2.3.2 Bayesian models with a speed prior
One of the first and most popular Bayesian models that incorporate a speed prior was
proposed by Weiss and Adelson (1998) and was subsequently presented in simplified
form by Weiss et al. (2002), mentioned in the previous section. In these models, the
visual system estimates velocity (speed and direction) as an ideal Bayesian observer
under the assumptions of visual measurement noise and a prior that favours slow
motion. The first model also features a preference for smooth motion. In particular, it
includes a prior on a velocity field that favours fields with small derivatives – more
specifically, the prior is inversely proportional to the sum of squares of a differential
operator that measures derivatives of all orders, including the zeroth3, summed over
the extent of the image. Weiss et al. (2002) simplified the model for instances of rigid
motion, where only the magnitude of the velocity is nonzero (higher-order derivatives





The prior in the model of Weiss et al. (2002) is multiplied by the likelihood of the
image sequence to give the posterior over velocities. The likelihood is formulated un-
3 A strong zeroth derivate describes fast velocities whereas strong higher-order derivatives describe
nonsmooth velocities.
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der the assumptions that the temporal derivative of the image sequence is corrupted
by additive Gaussian noise (whereas the spatial derivatives are not). Since both the
prior and the likelihood are Gaussian, the posterior is also Gaussian and the velocity
estimate (output of the model), which is the MAP solution, has an analytical form
(also see Figure 8 and section 3.2.2).
Despite the wide applicability of these models and the elegance by which they
explain different phenomena in motion perception, a number of authors have pointed
out certain theoretical limitations and have identified cases where the models cannot
account for certain subtle phenomena. Hürlimann et al. (2002) analyzed the model
of Weiss et al. (2002) for the case of drifting sinusoidal gratings of different contrasts
and noted that the estimated (“perceived”) speed v̂ of a drifting grating of contrast c





where k = σ/σp is the ratio of the standard deviations of the likelihood and the
prior. Hürlimann et al. (2002) point out that this derivation rests on the assumption
that the contrast response of the visual system is linear – an assumption likely to be
wrong as it ignores the saturation effect that has been observed in the responses of
motion-processing neurons of cortical area MT (Sclar et al., 1990). They propose a





where q < 2 would indicate a compressive nonlinear effect of contrast. The authors
then tested the model in a speed matching task where the apparent speeds of gratings
of different contrasts are compared. They showed that their model provides a better
description of the data than the original model of Weiss et al., 2002 does. The best-
fitting values of q were less than 2.
A few years later, Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) highlighted further limitations of
the model of Weiss et al. (2002). One such limitation is that both the likelihood func-
tion and the prior were chosen to be Gaussian merely for mathematical convenience
and not due to theoretical or empirical (e.g. compliance with natural scene statistics)
considerations. The noise characteristics of the model likelihood are also unlikely to
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accurately describe the noise properties of neurons involved in motion perception.
We have already seen how the model of Hürlimann et al. (2002) addresses one aspect
of the problem, by taking into account contrast saturation effects. Ascher and Grzy-
wacz (2000), who present an alternative Bayesian model with a slow speed prior, take
into account other properties of neural responses - namely response normalization
and multiplicative noise. Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) have similar considerations:
they note that the variability in cortical responses follows a Poisson distribution (that
is, the response variance is proportional to the mean firing rate). Combining this ob-
servation with a physiologically motivated contrast response function (Sclar et al.,
1990), they propose a likelihood with a width that is a separable function of speed
and contrast, σ(v, c) = g(v)h(c), and varies slowly with speed. With regards to the
prior, Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) adopt a non-parametric approach, assuming no
particular functional form but only that the prior is locally linear, i.e. it is expressed
as p(v) = av + b. In a similar vein, Zhang et al. (2013) express the speed prior in their
Bayesian model of peripheral motion perception as a Gaussian process, discretizing
the prior function at 25 control points. This formulation allows the approximation of
most continuous functions. Both Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) and Zhang et al. (2013)
find that the priors fitted to their psychophysical data exhibit considerable departures
from normality.
Once the shape of the speed prior is reconstructed using a non-parametric prior,
parametric forms of a similar shape can be chosen for subsequent predictions. For
example, observing that the extracted priors in the Stocker and Simoncelli (2006)
study had significantly heavier tails than a Gaussian and resembled a power-law dis-
tribution, Hedges et al. (2011) used a modified power-law prior. Although this is a
parametric prior, and more constrained than the priors used by Stocker and Simon-
celli (2006) and Zhang et al. (2013), it led to reasonably good quantitative predictions
in an experiment involving plaids (superpositions of drifting gratings at an angle).
An important and unique feature of the model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006)
is the modelling of trial-to-trial variability. Previous models (Ascher and Grzywacz,
2000; Weiss et al., 2002; Hürlimann et al., 2002) only account for average measure-
ments and do not deal with the trial-to-trial variability observed in psychophysical
experiments. Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) state that it is exactly this variability that
provides the additional information necessary to disambiguate the contributions of
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the likelihood and the prior. In the model of Weiss et al. (2002) these contributions
cannot be disambiguated even in principle because the likelihood and prior variances
only appear in computations as a single parameter – the ratio σ2/σ2p . The model of
Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) is described in more detail in section 4.3.1.
2.2.3.3 Outstanding questions regarding the slow speed prior
A prior on slow speeds has been proposed as a unifying explanation for a variety of
perceptual phenomena4. However, despite considerable amount of research in motion
perception, it is not known how this prior is shaped and how it compares to other
studied long-term priors described earlier (such as the light-from-above one). Are
we born with a slow speed prior (like chickens are born with a light-from-above
prior) or does it form during development, based on the spatiotemporal statistics of
natural scenes? In relation to this, can this prior change through exposure to different
statistics or does it become fixed at some point in the person’s lifetime? Do people
with different visual experiences, such as race car drivers or video game players
who are exposed to relatively high speeds, have different speed priors? What are
the characteristics of the prior distribution and do these vary among individuals?
Assuming the speed prior can be reshaped by exposure to modified environmental
statistics, how fast does this happen? Is it fast, such as the learning of the light-
from-above prior in Adams and Mamassian (2004) and the direction prior in Chalk
et al. (2010)? Or is it as slow as perceptual learning (Karni and Sagi, 1993) or the
learning of the isotropy prior (Knill, 2007), occurring over days? Would it really be
a reshaping of a single prior, so that any modification of the prior in the lab would
be partially reverted by re-exposure to the real world? Or would the new speed prior
be specific to the task/stimulus that reshaped it (which would imply the ability to
maintain multiple context-specific speed priors)? To my knowledge, only the question
of interindividual variability has been partially addressed (Stocker and Simoncelli,
2006; Zhang et al., 2013), although no attempt to date has been made to account for
this variability, e.g. in terms of interindividual differences in visual experience.
In the theoretical department, it is clear that all Bayesian models make various
assumptions – some of them for mathematical convenience or conceptual simplicity –
4 Weiss and Adelson (1998) present an impressive list of perceptual phenomena that their Bayesian model
with a prior for slow and smooth motion can account for.
2.2 outstanding questions and research motivation 29
and it has been shown that some of these assumptions must be abandoned in order to
account for certain subtle phenomena in motion perception. The model of Stocker and
Simoncelli (2006) makes the fewest assumptions regarding the noise characteristics
of visual measurements and the form of the speed prior. Is it possible that even this
model fails to capture some phenomena in its domain of applicability? Furthermore,
are its assumptions about the effect of contrast on cortical responses and perceived
speed robust?
These questions regarding the speed prior are the focus of the present work. This
list is of course far from exhaustive; for example, my investigation of Bayesian models
of speed perception is confined to the computational level (Marr and Poggio, 1976).
I do not address in this thesis the underlying neural mechanisms responsible for the
representation of probability distributions and for probabilistic inference and learn-
ing. As we saw in the previous section, that is not to say that physiological constraints
are ignored; such constraints are taken into account in model design.
3
S P E E D P R I O R C H A N G E A N D I T S E F F E C T O N P E R C E I V E D
M O T I O N D I R E C T I O N
The work described in this chapter was published in Current Biology (Sotiropoulos
et al., 2011) and can be accessed online at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982211010153.
3.1 introduction
The “slow speed prior” hypothesis – the hypothesis that our low-level visual system
assumes that objects are static or move slowly (typically 0.5◦/s, equivalent to 1 km/h
viewed at 30 m (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006)) rather than quickly – has been pos-
tulated because it can elegantly explain a number of perceptual biases observed in
situations of uncertainty (see 2.2.3.1). Interestingly, those biases affect not only the per-
ception of speed, but also of motion direction. For example, the motion direction of a
line whose endpoints are hidden (as in the previously described “aperture problem”
– Figure 4) or poorly visible (e.g. at low contrast, or for short stimulus presentations)
is perceived as being perpendicular to the line more often than it is. This perceptual
illusion is consistent with expecting that the line moves more slowly than it really
does. As is the case with most other structural priors, the slow speed prior is thought
to develop over the course of our lifetime, in a world where static or slowly moving
objects are more frequent than fast objects. However, in reality, when and how this
prior is acquired and whether it plays a causal role in extracting motion directions
is still unclear. To progress on these issues, I investigated whether new experiences
with visual stimuli that are considerably faster than the majority of those experienced
in everyday life could result in a disappearance or reversal of the classically reported





3.2.1.1 Stimulus and apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a Samsung 2043BW LCD monitor (20 inches diagonal
size, 1680× 1050 resolution, 75 Hz refresh rate), driven by an Apple Mac Mini 2009
computer (Intel Core2 Duo CPU, OpenGL-capable GPU) running MacOS X. Stimuli
were generated in MATLAB with the Psychophysics Toolbox v3 and consisted of a
field of parallel lines, translating rigidly and coherently (Figure 9). Line elements
had a length of 4◦ of visual angle, a thickness of 2.4′ (arcmin) and an orientation
of 110◦counter-clockwise from horizontal i.e. approximately 11 o’clock. Motion direc-
tion was either perpendicular to the line, which means 20◦ from horizontal (upward
motion; “up” condition), or oblique, that is, −20◦ from horizontal (downward mo-
tion; “down” condition). The equal distance of the two directions from the horizontal
ensured that any bias towards the horizontal (Loffler and Orbach, 2001) would have
the same effect in both conditions. In each trial, the direction was picked randomly
without replacement. Stimulus presentation durations, in milliseconds, were uniform
randomly chosen from the set {133, 266, 532}. Stimulus speed was either 4◦/s (test
session and training session of low-speed group, see below) or 8◦/s (training session
of high-speed group). With the exception of line length, all above parameters were
the same as in the first experiment in Lorenceau et al. (1993). The field of parallel
lines was visible through a circular mask of 24◦ in diameter and was of “infinite”
area (as lines moved out of the display, new lines moved in), as in previous work
(Lorenceau et al., 1993). The circular mask is much larger than individual lines, so
most of the lines (excluding those near the circumference of the aperture) are visible
in their entirety (i.e. including their endpoints). The background was black (lumin-
ance 0.29cd/m2) whereas the lines were grey. Two grey levels were used for the lines:
they were either shown with a luminance of 0.342cd/m2 corresponding to a Michel-
son contrast of 8% (“low” contrast) or with a luminance of 0.948cd/m2 corresponding
to a Michelson contrast of 53% (“high” contrast). Luminance measurements were per-
formed with an ColorCAL colorimeter (by Cambridge Research Systems).
3.2 methods 32
Figure 9: A, stimulus used in the experiment. The entire line field translates rigidly along
either of the two directions shown by the white arrows (the latter are not part of
the stimulus). B, cartoon of experimental hypothesis. Left: initially subjects have a
prior favouring slow speeds. Middle: the low-speed group is exposed to low speeds
(blue), while the high-speed group viewed faster speeds (red). Right: training causes
the high-speed group to shift their prior expectations towards higher speeds (red)
compared to the low-speed group (blue).
3.2.1.2 Subjects and procedure
Twelve naive subjects (all undergraduate or postgraduate students from the Univer-
sity of Edinburgh) participated in this experiment, evenly divided in two groups,
high-speed and low-speed. Subjects performed the experiment in a dimly lit, sound-
proof booth and were seated at a distance of 70 cm from the monitor. No chin rest
or eye tracker were used; instead subjects were instructed to maintain their head po-
sition throughout the experiment. They were also instructed to fixate at the centre
of the screen at all times. Each subject completed 5 sessions, each on a separate day,
at the same time of day for a given subject. Each session lasted 35-45 minutes and
was divided into 3 blocks - a small test block, followed by a large training block, fol-
lowed by a small test block identical to the first. Stimulus contrasts, durations and
directions were randomly interleaved in each block. Motion speed was kept constant
and equal to 4◦/s in the test blocks and in the training block of the low-speed group,
while it was fixed at 8◦/s in the training block of the high-speed group. The num-
ber of trials in each test block was chosen so that each condition was presented 18
times. Since there were 2 (equiprobable) contrast levels, 3 (equiprobable) durations
and 2 directions, the total number of trials was 2× 3× 2× 18 = 216. The number of
trials in the training block was chosen to be larger than both test blocks. In particu-
lar, each condition was presented 60 times, so that each training block consisted of
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2× 3× 2× 60 = 720 trials. In total, the number of trials in a session was 1152. The
structure of an individual trial was as follows:
1. A 200 ms fixation period, during which the static stimulus (line field) was dis-
played, together with a red central fixation dot (diameter = 24’).
2. A stimulus presentation period. The fixation dot disappeared at the beginning
of this period and motion of the line field was initiated. All lines moved in
the same direction and at the same speed, so the apparent motion is a global
translation of the entire field. The duration of this period was either 133, 266 or
532 ms.
3. A response period. The stimulus disappeared and the fixation dot reappeared.
Subjects reported the perceived direction of motion by pressing the Up/Down
arrow key on the keyboard. No horizontal contours were displayed at any point
in the trial and therefore subjects presumably had to rely on internal or external
(such as monitor frame) cues to determine the horizontal (and thus deviations
from it). When a response was made or when 3 seconds had elapsed, the trial
ended.
3.2.1.3 Data analysis
Following Lorenceau et al. (1993), the proportion of oblique responses (hereafter re-
ferred to as po) was measured for each duration and contrast level. Performance
(proportion of correct responses in the task) before and after training was also calcu-
lated separately for the upward- and downward-motion trials. ANOVAs were used
to determine whether there was a change in po between experimental groups, test
blocks (pre and post-training), sessions and durations. and whether there was a dif-
ference between high-speed and low-speed groups. Where appropriate, significant
results from ANOVA were followed up by t-tests with the Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons in order to examine these differences.
My hypothesis was that subjects might implicitly update their expectations towards
faster speeds, which would lead to a decrease in the direction bias, i.e. an increase in
po towards 0.5 (or perhaps even higher), when tested at the low speed.
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3.2.2 Bayesian model
To investigate quantitatively whether the results are consistent with the idea of a
changing speed prior, I adapted the Bayesian model of motion perception proposed
by Weiss et al. (2002). This model suggests that motion perception can be described as
an optimal estimation of object velocities under the assumption of local measurement
noise and an a priori preference for slower velocities (in Weiss et al. (2002), the prior is
centred at zero). The idea behind my extension of this model is that the speed prior
is initially centred close to zero but shifts away from zero from session to session
due to exposure. As described below, model parameters were determined to best fit
the group-averaged data. When receiving as inputs the moving stimulus image, the
model computes a velocity estimate, which is a variant of the solution of Weiss et al.
(2002), generalized to include a velocity prior with a non-zero mean. It can be shown
that the estimate is:
v̂ = −
 ∑ I2x + σ2σ2p ∑ Ix Iy




 ∑ Ix It − σ2σ2p µx





where Ix, Iy, It are the spatial (two dimensions) and temporal (partial) derivatives of
the image intensity function, , σ2/σ2p is the ratio of the likelihood and prior variances,
the only free parameter in the original model of Weiss et al. (2002), and µx, µy are the
means (two dimensions) of the velocity prior.
The sums were computed over the pixels in the stimulus images. The spatial deriv-
atives were computed using MATLAB’s gradient function, which performs a simple
subtraction of the values of neighbouring pixels along each axis. The temporal deriv-
ative is given by:
It = −(Ixvx + Iyvy) (8)
where vx, vy are the local velocity measurements in the two axes (and equal to the
veridical velocity of the stimulus and to each other, since the stimulus translates
rigidly). Following Weiss et al. (2002), I simulated the 2-alternative forced choice
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experiment by assuming that the decision (‘up’ or ‘down’) is corrupted by Gaussian
noise. The model response in the presence of this “decision noise” is given by:
r = sign(φ̂ + η)
where φ̂ is the angle between the estimated velocity vector and the horizontal and η a
zero-mean Gaussian random variable of standard deviation σD. φ̂ = 0◦ corresponds
to horizontal (rightward) motion perception, φ̂ > 0◦ corresponds to right-upward
motion and φ̂ < 0◦ to right-downward motion.
3.2.2.1 Updating the prior
The mean of the velocity prior µp = (µx, µy) was allowed to vary within a session
and between sessions. I modelled learning using the following three assumptions:
I. Based on observed performance differences between successive sessions, I as-
sumed that only a proportion (1− γ) of the shift of the prior within a session
would be retained in the next session. I call γ the unlearning rate parameter.
II. To describe the trajectory of the prior, two variants of the model were investig-
ated:
a) In the first (nonparametric) model, the prior mean is determined inde-
pendently for each session, by fitting to the data. In total, this model has
10 parameters: 5 for the prior mean locations after training (one for each
session), 1 for the ‘unlearning rate’ γ, 1 for the decision noise standard
deviation σD and 3 for the ratio σ2/σ2p for each duration.
b) In the second (parametric) model, the post-training prior mean was as-
sumed to vary linearly with time (i.e. session number). This model was
chosen after observing a roughly linear relation between prior means and
session number using the nonparametric model above. The prior mean
was modelled as: µx(s) = as + b, where s denotes the session number. This
reduces the number of prior-related parameters from 5 to 2.
III. Only the horizontal component µx of µp was allowed to vary; µy was fixed at
zero. Given that in the model vy is a Gaussian random variable, a nonzero value
of µy would correspond to an artificially imposed vertical directional bias that
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would mask the “up/down” bias that I wish to investigate and that is a result
of a prior favouring high speeds in general (without assuming a preference for
either vertical direction). A more accurate alternative would be to use a bimodal
distribution for vy with modes that get progressively closer to the two points
(µx, µy) = (vH cos(θ), vH sin(θ)) where vH is the training block speed (8◦/s )
and θ = ±20◦are the two possible motion directions. However, the closed-form
solution of Equation 7 would no longer apply, as it is based on assumptions of
normality.
All aforementioned parameters were determined via Maximum Likelihood estima-
tion: fminsearch in MATLAB was used to minimize the negative log-likelihood of
the entire low-contrast1 data set:
− ∑
s,b,d
pdatao (s, b, d) log p
model
o (s, b, d) + (1− pdatao (s, b, d)) log(1− pmodelo (s, b, d))
where po(s, b, d) is the probability of oblique response in the s-th session, the b-th
block (b = 1 for pre-training and 2 for post-training) and for the duration d. The
model probability of oblique response is given by
pmodelo (s, b, d) = p
model
o (s, b, d|φ = 20◦)P(φ = 20◦)+ pmodelo (s, b, d|φ = −20◦)P(φ = −20◦)
Since P(φ = 20◦) = P(φ = −20◦) = 0.5, this becomes
pmodelo (s, b, d) =
pmodelo (s, b, d|φ = 20◦) + pmodelo (s, b, d|φ = −20◦)
2
=
Φ(−φ̂+(s, b, d)/σD) + Φ(−φ̂−(s, b, d)/σD)
2
(9)
where Φ() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and φ̂+(s, b, d)
(respectively φ̂−(s, b, d)) is the direction estimate of the model when actual motion is
up (respectively down).
1 Fitting including the high-contrast data gave slightly worse results, presumably due to fitting more




Figure 10 shows the proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session
number. Initial perception of motion direction was accurate for both groups at high
contrast, as evidenced by the fact that po values are close to the 0.5 line (there is
an equal number of trials with perpendicular and oblique motion for every condition
and therefore veridical perception corresponds to po = 0.5). However, consistent with
previous findings (Lorenceau et al., 1993), perception is biased towards perpendicular
judgements at low contrast. A 4-way ANOVA of the low-contrast data with factors
group, session number, test block number and duration showed a main effect of
group on po (F1,239 = 10.67, p = 0.0013) as well as an effect of session (F4,239 = 3.8,
p = 0.0054) and test block number (F1,239 = 14.84, p = 0.0002) and an interaction of
group and session (F4,239 = 4.06, p = 0.0035) , indicating that learning was different
between groups. Subsequent analysis was thus performed separately for each group.
A 3-way ANOVA of the low-speed group with factors session number, test block
number and duration showed an effect of test block on po (F1,119 = 5.08, p = 0.0264),
suggesting a small amount of short-term learning due to the intervening training
block; however, perception was unaltered across sessions (F4,119 = 0.28, p = 0.893
for the effect of session). The same 3-way ANOVA of the high-speed group showed
that session had a strong effect (F4,119 = 8.06, p < 0.0001). Figure 10 indicates that
at low contrast, the initial perpendicular bias gradually diminished until the illusion
reversed and the motion direction was most often perceived as being more oblique.
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Figure 10: Proportion of oblique responses (po) plotted against session number for the low-
speed (n = 6) and high-speed (n = 6) groups and for all durations and contrast
levels in the experiment. Lines are best fits to the data. Dashed lines correspond
to data from the first test block in each session (before training) whereas full lines
correspond to the third block (after training). Error bars represent one standard
error of the mean across subjects.
Furthermore, at low contrast, the increase in po in the 133 ms (shortest) duration
condition across blocks of the same type (pre-training or post-training) appears nearly
linear (data points near the best-fit lines). The 266 ms condition is very similar, with
both the pre-training and the post-training blocks following an approximately linear
trend. To quantify these observations, linear models (both separately for pre- and
post-training blocks and with these blocks combined) were fitted to the 133 and 266
ms data (separately and combined) for each group. The fitted models were then
evaluated for significance via linear hypothesis tests (linhyptest in MATLAB). Table
1 lists the corresponding p values from the tests showing that linear fits for the high-
speed group were all significant at the 5% level.
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High-speed group (n = 6) pre-training p (d f = 28) post-training p (d f = 28) pre & post-training p (d f = 58)
133 ms 0.0126 0.0078 0.0004
266 ms 0.0011 0.0057 0.0000
133 & 266 ms 0.0023 0.0053 0.0001
Low-speed group (n = 6) pre-training p (d f = 28) post-training p (d f = 28) pre & post-training p (d f = 58)
133 ms 0.7084 0.6010 0.5311
266 ms 0.7939 0.3584 0.3776
133 & 266 ms 0.6748 0.8605 0.6805
Table 1: p values from linear hypothesis tests on the fitted models for po as a function of
session number in the low-contrast conditions. Models were fit separately for each
of the shortest two durations as well as for both combined. Models were also fit
separately for the pre-training and post-training blocks, as well as for both blocks
combined.
Interestingly, there is both a fast and a slow learning component reflected in the
change in po: a 2-way ANOVA on po with factors session number and test block num-
ber showed a within-session (F1,119 = 11.27, p = 0.0011 for the effect of test block
number) and an across-sessions effect (F4,119 = 8.73, p < 0.0001 for the effect of ses-
sion number). However, that does not mean that there are two types of learning; my
hypothesis, which is also reflected in modelling with the introduction of the unlearn-
ing rate parameter, is that part of learning occuring in a session reverts by the start of
the next session. This may be either due to subjects re-adapting to the statistics of their
environment (which presumably is dominated by slow speeds) or due to incomplete
consolidation of learning between successive sessions (subjects essentially partially
“forget” what they learned in the day). Regarding the effect of session number, t-tests
with the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons showed that sessions 3, 4
and 5 have a significantly higher po than the first session (p = 0.045, p = 0.001,
p < 0.0001, respectively) and that session 5 (last) had a significantly higher po than
session 2 (p = 0.005).
Figure 11 indicates that the high-speed group continues to be biased towards per-
pendicular judgements during the training block, when it is exposed to high speeds,
with a tendency for the bias to decrease with time. However, this tendency is not
significant: a 2-way ANOVA on training block po with factors session number and
duration shows neither an effect of session number (F4,89 = 1.18, p = 0.3268) nor an
interaction between duration and session number (F8,89 = 0.07, p = 0.9998) . These
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results provide evidence against the hypothesis that observed changes found in the
testing blocks are due to a response bias that develops through the training sessions.
Figure 11: Proportion of oblique responses (po) in the training (middle) block for each group
(high-speed, n = 6 or low-speed, n = 6). Error bars represent one standard error
of the mean across subjects.
Figure 12 shows that the changes in perception of motion direction occur whether
the actual motion is perpendicular or oblique: with exposure to high speeds, sub-
jects show a progressively smaller bias towards perceiving oblique motion as being
perpendicular (Figure 12A) but also develop a new bias towards perceiving perpen-
dicular motion as being oblique (Figure 12B). Note that here the dependent variable
is performance in the subset of perpendicular and oblique trials.
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Figure 12: Performance in trials with oblique (A) and perpendicular (B) motion. Data from
the low-speed (n = 6, blue circles) and the high-speed (n = 6, red triangles) groups.
Error bars represent one standard error of the mean across subjects.
3.3.2 Modelling
Figure 13 shows the means of the speed prior fitted to the group-averaged data both
parametrically and nonparametrically. It is observed that in the high-speed group the
prior shifts with training towards higher speeds – reaching a value of 6.2◦/s at the end
of the last session – whereas the prior for the low-speed group remains almost fixed.
The fitted σ2/σ2p values decrease monotonically with duration. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that with longer durations, as visual evidence becomes more reliable,
the likelihood becomes sharper.
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Figure 13: A, ratio of the variances of the likelihood (visual evidence) and the prior (expect-
ations) as a function of trial duration. With longer durations, visual evidence be-
comes more reliable and thus the likelihood is sharper and σ2/σ2p decreases. B&C,
evolution of the speed prior through training: mean of the speed prior as a func-
tion of session number for the nonparametric and parametric (linear) prior model,
respectively. Dashed lines/empty symbols are fits to the pre-training test block;
solid lines/filled symbols are fits to the post-training test block. For comparison,
the dotted line shows the actual stimulus speed in the test blocks.
The other best-fitting parameters were γ = 0.17 and 0.99 (high-speed and low-
speed group, respectively) and σD = 5◦ (both groups). The value of γ is almost 1
in the low-speed group, indicating that the small within-session effect seen in this
group vanishes by the next session. In contrast, only 17% of learning is lost between
sessions in the high-speed group. The predictions of the fitted model, computed
using Equation 9, are represented as triangular and circular points in Figure 14B.
Lines are linear fits to the experimental data (fit separately for each duration, block
and group), i.e. they are the same as in the top part of the figure (A) which is a replot
of the experimental data points and their across-sessions linear fits, shown here for
comparison. The model fits the data reasonably well as it can be seen by the fact that
the simulated data points fall close to the linear fits. The root mean squared error
(RMSE, which has the same units as po) of the nonparametric model fit for the high-
speed and low-speed group was 0.026 and 0.0403, respectively. The respective values
for the parametric variant are 0.0304 and 0.0486. As expected, the nonparametric
model fits the data better at the cost of greater complexity (number of parameters).
To compare the two models, I used the corrected Akaike information criterion (Hurvich
and Tsai, 1989), defined as
AICc =
2kn
n− k− 1 − 2L
where L is the log-likelihood of the data given the model, k the number of model
parameters and n the number of data points. The preferred model according to this
3.3 results 43
criterion is the one with the lowest score. AICc thus favours models that describe
the data well (via the second term) but penalizes complexity (i.e. models with many
parameters, via the first term). The model favoured by AICc was the parametric one
in both the high-speed (AICc = 739.2 parametric vs 745.5 nonparametric) and the
low-speed (727.8 parametric vs 736.2 nonparametric) groups.
Figure 14: A, proportion of oblique perceptions (po) in the low-contrast condition, for the 3
trial durations. Each point is the po for the first (empty symbols) or last (filled
symbols) test block of the session, for the high-speed (red) or the low-speed (blue)
group. Lines correspond to linear fits to each block/group combination. Error bars
denote between-subjects SEM. B, fits from the Bayesian model of motion percep-
tion (points) can account for the behaviour of the two groups (lines, corresponding
to the linear fits in A).
In theory, not only the mean of the prior could change with exposure, but also
its shape. Variants of the model where the prior variance (σ2p) was also allowed to
vary across sessions were also examined2. In the first variant, σ2p is a linear function
of session number (requiring 3 additional parameters); in the second variant, σ2p is
allowed to vary freely in each session (requiring 6 additional parameters). However,
it was found that these models were difficult to fit as the optimization process was
prone to local minima, due to the increased number of parameters compared to data
points. Essentially, these models were underconstrained by the data; for example, the
2 The mean was allowed to vary nonparametrically in these variants to avoid connstraining the fitted
variance due to constraints in the mean (since these parameters are not independent).
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linear-variance model predicts an increase in the mean and a decrease in the variance
also in the control (low-speed) group. Why is then no change in po across sessions
in the control group? The reason is that, while the mean increases, it remains lower
than the test speed; however, the variance decreases, which effectively increases the
influence of the prior in the posterior (and thus in perceived speed). Put simply, a
given degree of perpendicular bias (perceived speed being lower than the test speed)
may have come about either by a prior that favours very low speeds but is broad
(compared to the likelihood) or by a prior that favours somewhat higher speeds but is
sharp. The design of the experiment is not suitable to differentiate between these two
cases and therefore the resulting best-fit values for the (variable) mean and variance
of the prior are rendered meaningless.
3.4 discussion
As seen in 3.3.1, learning in the present experiment appears to have two components –
a fast (within-session) and a slow (across-sessions) one. The fast component is a type
of perceptual adaptation in which the perceptual system adapts to current conditions
(Adams et al., 2004; Chalk et al., 2010) and then is reset. The slow component re-
sembles perceptual learning (Karni and Sagi, 1993; Sagi and Tanne, 1994; Seitz et al.,
2005), where changes partially persist after the end of each session, accumulating
across days. The lack of a significant effect in the low-speed group is consistent with
the need for a learning threshold to be exceeded – a phenomenon that has been ob-
served in perceptual learning (Seitz and Dinse, 2007) and the learning of expectations
of object isotropy (Knill, 2007, see 2.2.1).
The results of this experiment demonstrate a clear effect of exposure to fast speeds
that is naturally explained in a Bayesian framework incorporating a prior on slow
speeds. However, there are certain experimental and theoretical limitations in the
present work. Firstly, accuracy in the reconstruction of the prior is limited by the
experimental paradigm because the experimentally measured variable that provides
information about the prior – proportion of oblique responses – is based on a rel-
atively small number of trials for each condition. Secondly, observers do not report
the actual perceived direction but whether direction is above or below a fixed dir-
ection (rightward); perceived direction is inferred under assumptions regarding the
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stochasticity of responses (decision noise). Thirdly, only two speeds (a lower “test”
speed of 4◦/s and a higher “training” speed of 8◦/s) are used in the experiment; it
would be interesting to investigate motion perception at a range of speeds, especially
in light of evidence that speed perception is subtly different at low speeds (around
1◦/s), deviating from the Weber-Fechner law (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006). Fourthly,
as discussed in 2.2.3.2, the extended Bayesian model of Weiss et al. (2002) imposes a
functional form on the prior that is likely to differ from subjects’ priors. Finally, the
variances of the prior and the likelihood appear always as a ratio (σ2/σ2p ), i.e. as a
single parameter to the model. Therefore, neither the perceptual uncertainty associ-
ated with the likelihood nor the width of the prior can be uniquely determined in the
current model (also see 2.2.3.2). These issues are addressed in the next two chapters.
In conclusion, the present experimental and modelling results provide, for the first
time, evidence in support of the plasticity of the speed prior via an implicit statistical
learning procedure (Kim et al., 2009; Di Luca et al., 2010), where no guidance was
given to subjects regarding the stimuli’s motion directions. This implicit learning
suggests that the brain is constantly revising even its most basic assumptions about
the environment even without explicit information regarding the true properties of
the stimuli in the world.
4
S P E E D P R I O R R E C O N S T R U C T I O N A N D I N T E R A C T I V E
E F F E C T S O F C O N T R A S T
The work described in this chapter was published in Vision Research (Sotiropoulos
et al., 2014) and can be accessed online at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0042698914000248.
4.1 introduction
The experimental paradigm of Chapter 3 provided the first evidence, to my know-
ledge, in support of the hypothesis that the speed prior is plastic in adults. However,
both the experimental paradigm and the Bayesian model used for predictions are lim-
ited. These limitations, discussed in 3.4, motivated the work described in this chapter.
An accurate and precise characterization of the speed prior was not the only mo-
tivation for the present experiment however. As we saw in Chapter 2, perception
has long been known to be susceptible to illusions and biases. Research on visual
motion perception in particular has revealed several types of those illusions and bi-
ases, such as motion-induced blindness (Ramachandran et al., 1991; Bonneh et al.,
2001), a preference for cardinal directions (Rauber and Treue, 1998; the motion equi-
valent of the oblique effect, Appelle, 1972), illusory “infinite regress” (Tse and Hsieh,
2006) and the dependence of perceived speed on stimulus contrast (Thompson, 1982;
Stone and Thompson, 1992; Hawken et al., 1994; Thompson et al., 1996; Blakemore
and Snowden, 1999; Hürlimann et al., 2002; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006, among oth-
ers). The effect of contrast on perceived speed has been extensively studied in both
first (Thompson, 1982; Stone and Thompson, 1992; Hawken et al., 1994; Brooks, 2001;
Hürlimann et al., 2002) and second-order (Ledgeway and Smith, 1995) motion; in
luminance-based and color-based (Cavanagh et al., 1984; Hawken et al., 1994) motion;
using narrowband (Thompson, 1982; Müller and Greenlee, 1994; Thompson et al.,
2006) and broadband (Blakemore and Snowden, 1999; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006)
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artificial (such as gratings) as well as natural stimuli (such as a virtual environment
simulating the viewpoint of a driver of a road vehicle Snowden et al., 1998). The
majority of these studies have found that decreases in contrast cause decreases in per-
ceived speed: a high-contrast stimulus moving at the same speed as a low-contrast
one appears faster, and as we saw in Chapter 3 this effect of contrast can also result
in changes in perceived direction.
However, a small number of studies have presented evidence for the opposite effect:
in certain cases, low contrast results in an increase in perceived speed. In these studies,
subjects were asked to match the speed of two drifting gratings of different contrasts
presented either simultaneously or sequentially. The ratio of the actual speeds of the
high- and low-contrast grating at the point of subjective equality (PSE) would be less
than 1 if low contrast decreases perceived speed (the high-contrast grating will have
to move more slowly in order to have the same apparent speed). Thompson (1982)
found that this ratio was indeed less than 1 for temporal frequencies below 8 Hz;
above that, the ratio becomes greater than 1 and contrast has the opposite effect. By
conducting his experiment at a variety of spatial frequencies, he concluded that this
“null point” is invariant with temporal frequency and not speed (which is the ratio
of temporal to spatial frequency): regardless of the spatial frequency used, the null
point was at 8 Hz. In a later study however, Stone and Thompson (1992) could not
replicate this switchover at 8 Hz: in all cases, lower contrast resulted in lower per-
ceived speed. They speculated that their earlier result was a methodological artifact
(subjects making judgements other than on speed), supported by the observation that
the task became very difficult at high temporal frequencies. In an attempt to settle
the issue, Thompson et al. (2006) performed a similar experiment and found evidence
for a null point; however, it was invariant in neither temporal frequency nor speed:
at a spatial frequency of 2 cycles/◦, the null point was 6-8 Hz (i.e. at a speed of 3-
4◦/s) whereas at a spatial frequency of 8 cycles/◦, the null point was 10-14 Hz (or
1.25-1.75◦/s). Meanwhile, data from other labs also suggested the existence of a null
point at 8 Hz (Hawken et al., 1994; Blakemore and Snowden, 1999). Both studies used
1 cycle/◦ gratings, corresponding to a speed of 8◦/s. At this rate of movement, low
contrast slightly increased perceived speed for all four subjected tested by Hawken
et al. (1994), whereas Blakemore and Snowden (1999) only found this to be the case
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in one of the three subjects tested, although in another subject judgements were more
veridical (low contrast did decrease perceived speed but less so).
Despite the wealth of data on the effect of contrast on perceived speed, the issue is
not satisfactorily resolved. Is this effect a function of speed? For Bayesian models that
assume a monotonically decreasing speed prior, a null point would prove problematic
as it would imply a prior that increases beyond that point, at higher speeds. Is such
a prior found in human subjects? Furthermore, if the null point were invariant to
temporal frequency and not speed, the role of a stimulus-independent speed prior
for predictions would be limited.
To address these questions, I performed a speed matching experiment very similar
to that by Thompson et al. (2006), using more subjects, each providing a larger num-
ber of PSE measurements than in previous studies. Most experimental parameters
were the same as those used in existing literature in order to allow for direct compar-
isons. Additionally, since the experimental paradigm of Thompson et al. (2006) is the
same as that of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), the Bayesian model of the latter can
be used in a straightforward manner to reconstruct the subjects’ speed priors. Fur-
thermore, by manipulating certain experimental parameters, my aim was to apply
the concept of the Chapter 3 experiment – frequent exposure to high speeds driving
prior learning – in order to change the speed prior and track its evolution during the
course of the experiment.
4.2 psychophysical experiment
4.2.1 Methods
5 subjects (all undergraduate or postgraduate students from the University of Edin-
burgh) participated in a 5-day experiment similar to Stocker and Simoncelli (2006):
a 2-alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) task where subjects were asked to compare the
speeds of two rightward-drifting sinusoidal gratings, a reference and a test one, that
were presented on either side of a central fixation point on a uniform midgrey back-
ground. Stimuli were presented on a Samsung 2043BW LCD monitor (20 inches di-
agonal size, 1680 × 1050 resolution, 75 Hz refresh rate), driven by an Apple Mac
Mini 2009 computer (Intel Core2 Duo CPU, OpenGL-capable GPU) running MacOS
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X. Stimuli were generated in MATLAB with the Psychophysics Toolbox v3. Subjects
performed the experiment in a dimly lit, soundproof booth and were seated at a
distance of 70 cm from the monitor. No chin rest or eye tracker were used; instead
subjects were instructed to maintain their head position throughout the experiment.
They were also instructed to fixate at the centre of the screen at all times. Each grating
was viewed through a sharp-edged circular aperture of 3◦ (degrees of visual angle) in
diameter. The aperture centers were 6◦ to the left and right of the fixation point. The
speed of the reference grating was held constant in each condition tested while the
speed of the test grating was adjusted through a QUEST staircase procedure (Watson
and Pelli, 1983) until the gratings appeared to move at the same speed. Each staircase
terminated after 35 trials, at which point the best estimate (the mode of the posterior
pdf of the QUEST algorithm) of the speed of the test grating at the point of subjective
equality (PSE) was recorded. The position (left/right) of the reference grating varied
randomly but was kept fixed throughout a single staircase (to minimize adaptation
effects). The spatial frequency of the gratings was fixed at 2 cycles/◦ - the lowest of
the two values used by Thompson et al. (2006) (2 and 8 cycles/◦). Gratings had one
of 3 contrast levels (3%, 15%, 95% Michelson contrast). The reference grating had one
of 4 speeds (1, 4, 8 and 12◦/s). Each condition corresponded to a unique combina-
tion of (reference and test) contrasts and reference grating speeds. Thus there were
12 conditions in total: 3 contrast level pairs (3%/15%, 3%/95% and 15%/95% for
reference/test grating, respectively) times 4 reference speeds. 6 of these conditions
- the ones corresponding to the lowest two speeds 1 and 4◦/s - were grouped in a
block of 420 trials in total. The remaining conditions - corresponding to the highest
two speeds - were grouped in a block of 1680 trials. Thus in each of the 5 sessions,
each subject performed 2 staircases for each condition in the low-speed block and 8
staircases for each condition in the high-speed block. Each trial started with a 200 ms
fixation period where only the fixation point was visible, followed by a 500 ms stimu-
lus presentation, followed by a response period in which the screen was blank (grey)
until the subject pressed the left or right arrow on the keyboard to indicate which
of the two gratings appeared to be moving faster. Subjects were offered an optional
short break every 10 minutes and a mandatory 5-minute break every 20 minutes. The
total duration of a daily session was approximately 1 hour.
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The reason that high-speed trials were presented 4 times more often is twofold.
First, previous research as well as pilot data indicated that speed judgements are
harder at speeds above 8◦/s and thus there is more variability in subject responses
(Stone and Thompson, 1992; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006), therefore more data is ne-
cessary to obtain accurate estimates of the means and variances of the PSE. Second,
by presenting high speeds more often, I wished to examine whether the prior fa-
voring slow speeds would gradually change to accommodate the stimulus statistics
– i.e. moving some probability mass towards higher speeds, in a similar fashion to
previous work (Sotiropoulos et al., 2011).
4.2.2 Results
PSE thresholds from each staircase were examined and average PSEs for each con-
dition are shown in Figure 15. Since in each trial the reference grating had a lower
contrast than the test grating, I will refer to the latter as the high-contrast grating. If
lower contrast results in higher perceived speed, the ratio of speeds of the high and
low-contrast grating (hereafter referred to as contrast-dependent bias - CDB) should
be greater than one (because the high-contrast grating would have to move faster in
order to appear as fast as the low-contrast one).
I first examined whether there was any notable effect of experience on CDB. A 3-
way ANOVA on CDB with factors session number, contrast condition and reference
speed showed that session had an effect on CDB in all but one subject (all p <
0.04). Data from two subjects that exhibited the highest effect of session is shown in
Figure 41 (in 8.2 of the Appendix). However, the effect of session was nonspecific and
nonmonotonic: there was no consistent change in CDB across sessions and certainly
not an increase towards unity. Furthermore, when only the trials with the lowest
two reference speeds are considered (where one would expect the greatest effect of
exposure to the more frequent high speeds, as in Sotiropoulos et al., 2011), ANOVAs
on individual subjects’ data failed to show an effect of session (all p > 0.1) except in
one subject (where F4,30 = 3.59, p = 0.017). Therefore I concluded that there was no
consistent perceptual change and thus data from all sessions was pooled, providing
a rich data set for subsequent analysis and modelling.
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I then examined whether CDB varied as a function of reference speed. Unlike in
some previous reports, CDB did not exceed unity in the majority of subjects and
conditions; the only exception was one subject (S5) at the lowest contrasts (3% and
15%) and highest speed (12◦/s), although CDB was not significantly different from
unity (t39 = 1.62, p = 0.114, two-tailed t-test). In all other cases, CDB was less than
one, meaning that lowering contrast resulted in a decrease in perceived speed. In
other words, apart from the aforementioned single case, there was no “null point” –
in contrast to the findings of Thompson et al. (2006).
It is worth noting the considerable variability across subjects, especially with re-
gards to the effect of contrast difference on perceived speed. Furthermore, when data
from all subjects is pooled, there is a tendency towards more veridical perception as
speed increases in the lowest-contrasts condition, seen as the positive slope of the
black line in the leftmost panel of Figure 15. However, the opposite tendency is seen
in the highest-contrasts condition (negative slope of the black line in rightmost panel
of Figure 15). The aforementioned 3-way ANOVA showed that there is a marginally
significant effect of speed alone (F3,1440 = 2.77, p = 0.0402) but a highly significant
interaction of speed and contrast condition (F6,1440 = 9.11, p < 0.0001).
In summary, at contrasts below 15%, results are in qualitative agreement with the
finding of Hawken et al. (1994) that as reference speed increased, the effect of contrast
on perceived speed diminished and in one case even reversed. However, results at
higher contrasts (where both gratings had contrasts at least 15%) show the opposite




To model the relationship between perceived and actual speed under various con-
trasts and reference speeds and to extract the priors and likelihoods of subjects, the
Bayesian model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) was used. Briefly, in each trial, an
ideal observer computes estimates of the speed of each grating and chooses the grat-
ing that has a higher estimated speed. Perceived speed is assumed to be the mode of
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Figure 15: Mean ratio of speeds of the high (vHC) and low-contrast (vLC) gratings at the point
of subjective equality (PSE), plotted as a function of speed, separately for each
contrast condition. Colored points represent individual subjects (n = 5); black
points represent the combined data from all subjects. Error bars are standard error
of the mean.
the posterior probability density function (pdf) that results from the combination of
prior and likelihood. The functional form of the prior is log-linear:
p(v) = exp(av + b) (10)
a is the local slope of the logarithm of the prior: the log-prior is approximated by a
straight line within a narrow speed range but the slope a varies with speed across
larger scales (such as across points on a log scale). To reflect the dependence of the
slope on speed, it is hereafter denoted by a(v). The likelihood is Gaussian with mean
equal to the true stimulus speed and width (standard deviation) separable in speed
and contrast:
σ(v, c) = g(v)h(c) (11)
where the dependence on contrast, h(c), obeys a physiologically motivated inverse








The posterior distribution p(v̂|v) of the estimated speed v̂ is shown to be Gaussian
with mean and variance
E(v̂) = v + a(v)σ2(v, c) (13)
Var(v̂) = σ2(v, c) (14)
where v is the true stimulus speed, a(v) is the slope of the logarithm of the prior
around v and σ is the standard deviation of the likelihood function, which depends
on both speed and contrast. The term a(v)σ2(v, c) is the prior-induced bias of the
estimated speed.
The model contains 10 free parameters: 4 for each of a(v) and g(v) (which are not
assumed to be any particular function of speed and thus require one parameter for
each reference speed used in the experiment) and 2 for h(c). With 10 free parameters,
optimization is not trivial and local minima cannot be avoided entirely. Stocker and
Simoncelli (2006) exploit the trial-to-trial variability in the data to sufficiently con-
strain their model by assuming that in each trial the observer samples from the two
posterior pdfs and chooses the stimulus whose sample has the highest speed value.
They thus derive an expression for the psychometric function







where v̂1, v̂2 are the estimated speeds of the two gratings (reference and test). Equa-
tion 15 is fit to the entire dataset via a maximum-likelihood procedure.
I adopt a different, computationally cheaper, approach: given the PSE for a partic-
ular condition, the means of the posterior for each grating are equal and thus from
Equation 13:
v1 + a(v1)σ2(v1, c1) = v2 + a(v2)σ2(v2, c2) (16)
Since v is known for both gratings, a(v), g(v) and h(c) can be fit to the data but be-
cause a(v) and σ(v, c) appear in a product there are no unique best-fitting values for
them, i.e. the model is not sufficiently constrained as it is. However, the data consists
of multiple staircases for each condition and the staircase-to-staircase variability can
be exploited to constrain the model. In each session, there are 2 staircases for each of
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the low reference speeds and 8 for each of the high reference speeds. Since session
number did not have a consistent observable effect on speed perception, data can be
pooled, yielding 10 staircases for each of the low-speed conditions and 40 for each
of the high-speed conditions. The squared standard error (equivalent to sample vari-
ance) σ2PSE of the PSE across the 10 (or 40) staircases is informative: it can be shown
to be proportional to the variance of the distribution of the test speed v2 at the PSE
and inversely proportional to the number of trials in a single staircase (see 8.1.3). The
pdf of the distribution of v2 (conditioned on the reference speed v1 and the fact that
v̂1 = v̂2 at the PSE) is Gaussian with variance equal to the sum of variances of the
likelihoods of the two gratings. In particular (see 8.1.1) :
p(v2|v1, v̂1 = v̂2) ∼ N (v1 + a(v1)(σ21 − σ22 ), σ21 + σ22 ) (17)







where N is the number of trials in a staircase (40 throughout the experiment) and α is
a constant of proportionality. By comparing my fitting method against that of Stocker
and Simoncelli (2006), using an independent large dataset (21 subjects) obtained with
an identical stimulus and task configuration and staircase procedure (Berbec, 2013,








Using Equations 16 and 19, the model was fit with a least-squares procedure
(lsqnonlin function, MATLAB). The (unnormalized) priors were reconstructed as
in Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), by numerical integration of the fitted local slope





where a(v) (the slope as a function of speed) was linearly interpolated using the
slope values at the 4 reference speeds. The maximum and baseline firing rates (rmax
and rbase) in Equation 12 were set to 1 and 0.2, respectively.
4.3.2 Results
The Bayesian model fits the data reasonably well; however, as seen in Figure 16, the
model is unable to capture the differential effect of speed on CDB (the interaction
between contrast condition and speed described in 5.2.2). This is most evident with
subject S5 (magenta triangles), who shows the strongest interaction effect: the model
fit is satisfactory in the last two contrast conditions (middle and rightmost panels of
Figure 16) but not in the first contrast condition (leftmost panel of Figure 16).
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Figure 16: Mean ratio of speeds of the high (vHC) and low-contrast (vLC) gratings at the point
of subjective equality (PSE), plotted as a function of speed, separately for each con-
trast condition. Points represent experimental data (as in Figure 15); lines repres-
ent predictions of the fitted Bayesian model. Color represents individual subjects
(n = 5); black represents the combined data from all subjects.
The extracted priors and likelihood widths (Figure 17) are quantitatively similar to
Stocker and Simoncelli (2006). The biggest difference is in the values of g(v), which
are somewhat higher for all subjects, compared to the two representative subjects
shown in Figure 4 of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006); however, g(v) and h(c) always
appear in a product (Equation 11) and therefore there is no unique set of values for
either of these functions - in other words, the likelihood model is not fully constrained.
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As in Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), g(v) for most subjects is not an increasing func-
tion of reference speed, as one might expect from Weber’s law; in particular, the
group g(v) has a minimum at 4◦/s. This was also reflected in subjects’ (and my own)
accounts, who found trials with speeds between 4◦/s and 8◦/s the easiest. Discrep-
ancies between my extracted components and those of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006)
may also be due to the small differences in the stimuli (mainly the different trial
duration and spatial bandwidth of the gratings) between my experiment and that of
Stocker and Simoncelli (2006). It is also interesting to note the differences in extrac-
ted priors among subjects. In particular, S5 exhibits a much shallower prior than S3.
Finally, as in Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), the priors for some subjects (S1 and S5)
tend to flatten at the lowest and highest speeds.















































Figure 17: Extracted prior (left panel); speed-dependent g(v) (middle panel) and contrast-
dependent h(c) (right panel) components of likelihood width σ(v, c) in the
Bayesian model. Colored curves are individual subjects (n = 5); black curves are
all subjects combined.
The Bayesian model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) provides a reasonable fit to
the data (R2 = 0.78, SSE = 0.354) but fails to account for the observed interaction
effect: in the model, the effect of speed on the ratio v̂HC/v̂LC is qualitatively the same
across all contrasts conditions. For example, if the ratio increases with speed in one
contrast condition, then it has to also increase in the other contrast conditions. This
is because the same prior is used across all contrasts. Clearly, the model needs to
be modified to account for the interaction. One approach is the use of a different
speed prior depending on contrast level: a prior for high-contrast stimuli that has a
smaller slope at low speeds than the prior for low-contrast stimuli (and vice versa
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at high speeds). Contrast-modulated priors have been used successfully elsewhere;
for example, Mamassian and Landy (2001) used a Bayesian model to describe the
way human observers interpret the shape of (2D) drawings of 3D objects based on
their shading and on the geometry of parallel dark and bright contours on the ob-
jects. Their model included a prior on the tilt and slant of object surfaces and of
lighting directions that depended on the contrast of the shading and of the parallel
contours. However, their choice rested on the fact that their stimuli had little external
noise (their attributes were easily visible) and on the assumption that the internal (ob-
server) noise was equally small. In contrast, internal noise in the form of a likelihood
function is an integral part of the present model, which assumes that low contrast
broadens the likelihood by increasing the influence of internal noise. Furthermore,
to my knowledge, there is no evidence from analyses of natural scene statistics that
speed distributions depend on contrast.
Another approach is to model the interaction at the level of the speed measure-
ment, which corresponds to the likelihood mean in the Bayesian model. In particular,
an interaction effect would be possible if the average value of the speed measure-
ments depended on the physical stimulus speed and contrast in a nonlinear fashion,
such as through a product. One possible choice of such a nonlinearity would be the
modification of Equation 13 to
E(v̂) = f (v, c) + a(v)σ2(v, c) (21)
where f (v, c) is no longer the true stimulus speed but a nonlinear function of true
speed and contrast. Such a nonlinearity has been proposed by opponents of Bayesian
models of speed perception in an attempt to explain the speed-dependent effect of
contrast on perceived speed (Thompson et al., 2006). In their “ratio model”, itself an
extension of the “weighted intersection model” (WIM) of Perrone and Thiele (2002),
perceived speed is given by the ratio of a low-pass and a band-pass temporal filter.
Since these filters were originally proposed to model speed tuning as a result of the
integration of motion-sensitive neurons in area V1, it is natural to apply them at an
earlier stage than the Bayesian computations (thought to be carried out in area MT,
Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006). Such an early stage naturally corresponds to modifying
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the actual stimulus speed used as input to the Bayesian model - that is, modifying
the mean of the likelihood.
The two filters proposed by Thompson et al. (2006), low-pass and band-pass, are
inseparable functions of temporal frequency (ω) and contrast (c) and their responses















a = ((2πωτ1)2 + 1)−9/2
b = ((2πωτ2)2 + 1)−10/2
τ1 and τ2 are time constants, and sp and sm are semi-saturation constants of the filters.





Equation 22 thus provides the nonlinearity f (v, c) used in Equation 21.
To avoid adding new free parameters to the model, I used a nested optimization
procedure to find the best-fitting values for these parameters and fixed them across
all subjects and conditions before fitting the parameters of the Bayesian model. I
found that the best-fitting value for both sp and sm is 0.5, which is within the range
of values used in (Thompson et al., 2006). The other 3 parameters, τ1, τ2 and k, which
in Thompson et al. (2006) (who followed Perrone and Thiele, 2002) were fixed to
0.0072, 0.0043 (both in units of seconds) and 4 (dimensionless), respectively, had to
be changed for out data. In particular, k was set to 0.55 and the time constants were
scaled by 4.9, yielding 0.0353 and 0.0211 for τ1 and τ2, respectively. With these para-
meter values, the output of the ratio model is equal to the true stimulus speed at
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all contrasts, except at low speeds (up to 2◦/s), where speed mildly decreases with
contrast (Figure 18, left panel).































































































Figure 18: Output of the ratio model as a function of stimulus speed for the 3 contrast values
used in the experiment (left panel). Parameter values are from the combined (ra-
tio+Bayesian) model that best fits the entire data. Inset shows the ratio model out-
put with the parameter values used by Thompson et al. (2006); “perceived speed”
of the best-fit Bayesian (middle panel) and combined (right panel) models as a
function of stimulus speed. Diagonal dashed line corresponds to veridical percep-
tion.
By incorporating the ratio model of Thompson et al. (2006) in the Bayesian model
of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), I was able to provide a better description of the data
(Figure 19), partially accounting for the interaction effect of speed and contrast and
yielding a 31% improvement in the fits (R2 = 0.85, SSE = 0.243). This is remarkable
given that the number of free parameters in the combined model is the same as
in the Bayesian model (namely 10). Note that treating the rest of the ratio model
parameters as free resulted in minimal further improvement in fits - too small to
justify the increased model complexity.
It should also be noted that the ratio model on its own is not able to account
for the data, even if all of its parameters are free. The main reason for this is that
there is no set of parameter values that results in a increase in perceived speed with
increasing contrast, as is found in my data: up to a certain (low) stimulus speed,
which corresponds to the null point reported by Thompson et al. (2006), the output
of the ratio model (corresponding to perceived speed) is an increasing function of
contrast but beyond that speed the model output is a decreasing or constant function
of contrast, across the entire parameter space. In the Bayesian and combined models,
however, perceived speed increases with contrast across all stimulus speeds, as seen
in my data (Figure 18).
4.4 discussion 60
The improved performance of the combined model at low stimulus speeds (around
1◦/s) is due to the opposite effects of the ratio model and of the prior of the Bayesian
model on perceived speed. At high contrasts, the prior-induced decrease in perceived
speed is attenuated at low speeds, matching the data better (Figure 19, right panel).
This attenuation could not have been provided solely by the prior because it would
have to apply to all contrast conditions and thus would not fit the data well.
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Figure 19: Mean ratio of speeds of the high (vHC) and low-contrast (vLC) gratings at the point
of subjective equality (PSE), plotted as a function of speed, separately for each
contrast condition. Points represent experimental data (as in Figure 15); lines rep-
resent predictions of the fitted combined (Ratio+Bayesian) model. Color represents
individual subjects (n = 5); black represents the combined data from all subjects.
The extracted priors under the combined model are quantitatively similar to those
of the original Bayesian model, with the exception of one subject (S1), whose prior is
significantly steeper under the combined model (Figure 20).
4.4 discussion
Qualitatively, these results replicate the majority of existing literature in finding that
lower contrast decreases perceived speed in all conditions tested. Only in one of the
five subjects, at the highest speed (12◦/s) and only at the lowest contrasts (3% and
15% Michelson contrast for the two gratings) tested was there an inversion of this
relationship, although this did not reach significance.
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Prior Likelihood width














































Figure 20: Extracted prior (left panel); speed-dependent g(v) (middle panel) and contrast-
dependent h(c) (right panel) components of likelihood width σ(v, c) in the com-
bined (Ratio+Bayesian) model. Colored curves are individual subjects (n = 5);
black curves are all subjects combined.
When the data is quantitatively examined, however, it is apparent that at the low-
est tested contrasts, CDB decreases as speed increases (Figure 15, leftmost panel):
lowering contrast does not decrease perceived speed as much when speeds are high.
Interestingly, the situation is reversed at the highest tested contrasts (15% and 95%
Michelson contrast) and CDB becomes more prominent at high speeds.
Does, then, this differential effect of contrast at high speeds depend on absolute
contrast levels? Data from existing literature are mixed. Among the studies that have
shown evidence that decreasing contrast increases perceived speed (Thompson, 1982;
Hawken et al., 1994; Blakemore and Snowden, 1999; Thompson et al., 2006), only that
of Hawken et al. (1994) used contrasts as low as the lowest ones used in the present
experiment. In the other 3 studies, a reference grating of either 25% (Thompson, 1982),
64% (Blakemore and Snowden, 1999) or 70% (Thompson et al., 2006) was matched
against test gratings of lower contrasts. Since these three studies contradict my find-
ings at comparable levels of contrast, a natural question is: are there systematic dif-
ferences in experimental parameters (other than speed and contrast) between these
3 studies and the rest of the literature (including the present study) that shows evid-
ence of a decrease in perceived speed with decreasing contrast?
I suggest that temporal frequency is not such a parameter; I used temporal frequen-
cies at least as high as those used by all studies that found an increase in perceived
speed with decreased contrast (Thompson, 1982; Hawken et al., 1994; Blakemore and
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Snowden, 1999; Thompson et al., 2006). If there were a “null point” in the temporal
frequency axis, my experiment ought to have hit it. Spatial frequency is likely not a
factor either – I used the same value as in one of the conditions in Thompson et al.
(2006) (2 cycles/◦). The same holds for other stimulus parameters, such as the type,
location and drift direction of the gratings – all these parameters were similar in
conflicting studies.
Procedural differences are also unlikely to explain why I failed to find the null
point. One possible factor could be the different methods of determining the PSE.
However, most studies utilized staircase procedures, often very similar - e.g. Blakemore
and Snowden (1999) used the same maximum-likelihood-based procedure (QUEST,
Watson and Pelli, 1983) that I did. Another possible factor is the task design: the
two gratings could be presented simultaneously or successively and there are re-
ports that such manipulations are important (Stone and Thompson, 1992; Blakemore
and Snowden, 1999); indeed, two of the studies that conflict with mine used success-
ive presentations (Blakemore and Snowden, 1999; Thompson et al., 2006). However,
the other two conflicting studies used simultaneous presentations (Thompson, 1982;
Hawken et al., 1994).
It is possible that biases and strategies not directly related to speed perception
have an effect, which may also interact with the experimental design: certain bi-
ases/strategies may be employed only on certain experimental setups. For example,
when subjects are highly uncertain about the relative speed of two gratings, they
may be inclined to pick the grating of the higher contrast as being the faster one
(because it is also the most salient). Similar biases have been observed in 2-AFC ex-
periments of orientation discrimination (Eero Simoncelli, personal communication).
Furthermore, differences in the way subjects are instructed to perform the task may
also play a role. For example, subjects sometimes differ in the strategies and response
biases they might use when dealing with uncertainty, even if the experimental condi-
tions are identical, and in some cases this is due to subtle differences in instructions.
There could also be a “threshold” effect of stimulus uncertainty: at very low contrasts
and high speeds (high uncertainty), subjects may switch to a semi-random response
strategy, for example by alternating “left” and “right” keypresses.
As for the inability of the experimental procedure to cause a shift in the speed
prior via exposure to high speeds more frequently than to low speeds, as evidenced
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in the experiment of Chapter 3, I can only speculate about the reasons, based on the
differences between the two experiments. One possibility is the difference in stimulus
variety between the two experiments: in Chapter 3, there were only two contrast levels
and two speeds – one low and one high; in the present experiment each grating had
one of three different contrasts, for a total of three contrast conditions. Furthermore,
the gratings in the present experiment had a wide range of speeds – one grating had
one of four values whereas the speed of the other could have any value from the used
speed range. It is thus possible that the large variety of presented speed and contrast
combinations made the process of updating the speed prior more difficult. Another
conceivable possibility is that subjects are less likely to use the newly learned prior
when making explicit speed judgements (as is the case in the present experiment), in-
stead using the default prior that is innate or acquired over their lifetime. In contrast,
perceptual judgements in the Chapter 3 experiment were about direction and thus
their expectations about speed were only used implicitly (through the relationship
between speed and direction during global velocity estimation); it may be the case
that the newly learned prior is only applicable during implicit, unconscious estima-
tion. Another related possibility is that people are more accustomed (and thus more
sensitive) to estimating direction rather than speed, since precise direction estimation
seems like a more common task than speed estimation in everyday life (for example
for accurate aiming in sports or hunting).
In regards to modelling, I have presented a significantly faster model fitting pro-
cedure than that used by Stocker and Simoncelli (2006); instead of using every trial
of every staircase per condition, I used just the final estimate of the staircase and
the variability of this estimate across staircases. Effectively, the model is fit by using
just 1/Nth of the data, where N is the number of trials in a single staircase (35 in
this case). Using an independent large dataset (Berbec, 2013, see 8.1.2 and Chapter
5), I compared my fitting method to that of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) and, like
them, I used the likelihood of the data under the best-fitting model as a perform-
ance metric, whereby 100% corresponds to the likelihood of the data when separate
Weibull functions for each condition are fit to it and 0% the likelihood under the
random (coin-flipping) model. Over the entire dataset, the performance of my fitting
method (averaged over subjects) is 87%, compared to 93% of the method of Stocker
and Simoncelli (2006). The extracted prior and likelihood components were also very
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similar between the two methods. Therefore my method can be useful during model
selection/design, allowing rapid iteration between fitting and design, until a suitable
model is found, which can then be fit with the method of Stocker and Simoncelli
(2006) for slightly more accurate quantitative predictions. My method could also be
used in cases where not every trial of the staircase is available, such as when mod-
eling data from existing literature (where usually only the PSE means and standard
errors are reported).
By incorporating the ratio model of Thompson et al. (2006) (which in itself is un-
able to describe the present data, also see Figure 18) as a pre-processing step in the
Bayesian model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), I was able to provide an improved
account of the interaction effect of contrast and speed. However, this improvement
is restricted to low speeds (around 1◦/s), where an increase in contrast causes a
mild decrease in speed; there is no improvement at high speeds (around 12◦/s). The
observed interaction could be better accounted for by a model in which perceived
speed (before the Bayesian computations) decreases with contrast at low speeds but
increases with contrast at high speeds. The simple ratio model of Thompson et al.
(2006) can only produce the former effect; it cannot produce an increase in perceived
speed with contrast at high speeds. It would be interesting to examine whether an
extended version of the ratio model, for example one that incorporates band-pass
filters tuned to various temporal frequencies, could better account for the interaction;
this is left as future work. As a final note, unlike the Bayesian model, the ratio model
seemingly constitutes a departure from a normative explanation of speed perception.
However, the ratio model was proposed, in the form of the WIM model (Perrone
and Thiele, 2002; Perrone, 2005), as a biologically plausible way of achieving variable
speed tuning in MT neurons by using a small number of V1 neurons tuned not to
speeds but to a limited range of spatial and temporal frequencies. Thus, while the
WIM model does not result in optimal perception, it can be argued that this is due to
biological constraints earlier in the visual hierarchy (V1) rather than an inherent sub-
optimality in the model, in much the same way that the Bayesian model is optimal
under the assumption of noisy measurements.
5
S P E E D P R I O R VA R I A B I L I T Y A N D V I S U A L E X P E R I E N C E
5.1 introduction
The psychophysical data collected in the experiment of Chapter 4 allowed for the
nonparametric reconstruction of subjects’ speed priors using the methods of Stocker
and Simoncelli (2006). The reconstructed priors had considerably heavier tails than
the best-fitting Gaussians would , instead approximating inverse power-law distribu-
tions, which are monotonic, as were the priors in Stocker and Simoncelli (2006). This
was reflected in their subjects’ data by the fact that low contrast decreased perceived
speed throughout the entire speed range used. Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) noted
that if at higher speeds low contrast increased perceived speed, their model would
account for this with a prior that increases at these speeds. Could the speed prior be
nonmonotonic in some observers, showing an increase at speeds higher than those
used by Stocker and Simoncelli (2006)?
On a related note, the results of Chapter 4 confirmed the large interindividual vari-
ability in priors that was seen in previous work (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Hedges
et al., 2011). Where could this variability stem from? Innate, genetically determined
differences is one possibility; another is differences in visual experience: given that
the visual system is very plastic during infancy and even retains significant plasticity
in adulthood, it is conceivable that individuals exposed to different environmental
motion statistics may differ in their motion estimation biases. For example, profes-
sional drivers are routinely exposed to fast optical flow, particularly in the periphery,
and video games (especially action games) contain large amounts of fast motion.
Avid players who spend several hours per week playing games may be exposed to
fast speeds often enough so that, over time, their speed prior has changed to accom-
modate the different statistical structure of their environment, which includes the
virtual environments of games. Video games are known to have diverse effects on
vision (Bavelier et al., 2012), such as the improvement of target identification when
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the target is surrounded by distractors in close proximity (Green and Bavelier, 2007)
or the enhancement of temporal resolution of the visual system as evidenced by sig-
nificant reductions in backward masking – whereby a target is harder to see if it is
quickly followed by a distractor (Li et al., 2010). Of particular interest here is also the
enhancement of contrast sensitivity that has been observed in avid gamers (Li et al.,
2009) which, together with the possible increased exposure to fast motion, may lead
to measurable differences between gamers and nongamers under the experimental
paradigm of Chapter 4. Could avid video gamers have speed priors that favour fast
speeds more than those of nongamers?
The work described in this chapter was undertaken to address the above questions.
The experimental part of this work includes contributions by Dan Berbec as part of
his Honours project (Berbec, 2013) supervised by Peggy Seriès and co-supervised
by myself. The present experiments were based on the code for the experiments of
the previous two chapters. Dan recruited the experiment participants, performed the
experiments and implemented the data cleanup algorithm described in 5.2.2.
5.2 psychophysical experiments
5.2.1 Methods
21 subjects (all undergraduate or postgraduate students from the University of Edin-
burgh) participated in two interleaved experiments conducted over two consecutive
days – on each day, a session of Experiment 1 (see below) was followed by a session
of Experiment 2. Subjects were chosen based on their experience with first-person-
shooter (FPS) video games, which typically expose the player to significantly high
speeds in the form of fast-moving objects or fast optical flow. Of the 21 subjects, 10
were gamers having played FPS games for at least 5 hours per week in the past year;
the remaining 11 subjects rarely (or never) played games, and these were mostly static
games. Of the 10 gamers, 2 were female and 8 were male; of the 11 non-gamers, 6
were female and 5 were male. In data analysis, subjects were grouped both according
to gender and according to gaming experience; thus there were 4 groups (gamers,
non-gamers, males, females) with partial overlap and pairwise unbalanced (more
gamers than nongamers and more males than females).
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The paradigm of Experiment 1 was identical to the Chapter 3 experiment, i.e. sub-
jects were asked to judge the direction of motion of a field of lines. The paradigm
of Experiment 2 was identical to the Chapter 4 experiment, i.e. subjects had to com-
pare the speeds of drifting gratings of different contrasts. Experimental parameters
(including the laboratory environment and computer hardware and software) for the
two experiments were thus the same as their Chapter 3 and 4 counterparts, with the
main difference being that this time the aim was to measure the speed and direction
biases (and extract the priors) of the subjects and not attempt to change these bi-
ases through extensive exposure to high speeds as in the previous experiments. Thus
sessions in the new experiments had to be long enough to provide reliable measure-
ments of subjects’ speed and direction judgements but not as long as to significantly
change their speed prior through exposure. More specifically, the new experiments
differed from their Chapter 3 and 4 counterparts in the following ways:
5.2.1.1 Experiment 1 (field-of-lines)
• There was no training block in each of the two sessions; a session consisted of
two short test blocks of the exact same structure and stimulus parameters as
the pre-training and post-training blocks of the Chapter 3 experiment.
5.2.1.2 Experiment 2 (gratings)
• Grating speeds were chosen from the set 2, 4, 8, 12, 16◦/s, instead of 1, 4, 8,
12◦/s in the Chapter 4 experiment. The highest speed (16◦/s) was used in order
to explore whether speed biases at such high speeds are comparable to those at
lower speed. Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) note that speed judgements above
12 were unreliable for their subjects and thus were not studied. In pilot trials, I
found that response variability was significantly higher at 16◦/s than at 12◦/s
however not to the extent that it impairs judgements excessively.
• High speeds (8, 12 and 16◦/s) were presented as frequently as low speeds. In
total (over the two experimental sessions), each subject performed 6 staircases
at each of the 5 speeds and 3 contrast pairs (15 conditions in total), compared
to the 10 and 40 staircases performed at each condition at low and high speeds,
respectively, in the Chapter 4 experiment.
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The experimental setup (computer software and hardware, laboratory environment)
was identical to that of Chapters 3 and 4.
5.2.2 Results
5.2.2.1 Experiment 1 (field-of-lines)
Collected data was filtered according to two pre hoc criteria, based on pilot data and
on the main results from the Chapter 3 experiment. Data that met at least one of these
criteria – which was the case for 7 subjects – was excluded from further analysis. Note
that only the blocks of trials that met one or both of the pre hoc criteria were eliminated
from the subject’s data; other blocks of the same subject that did not meet any of the
criteria were kept. Out of the 20 blocks in total, between 2 and 6 blocks (mean: 3.9,
st.dev.: 1.5) were eliminated. The pre hoc criteria were the following:
1. Too large proportion of oblique responses (po > 0.7) in the low-contrast trials
(at any duration). Such a high po is highly unlikely to correspond to true per-
ception of oblique motion (since the bias in untrained subject is in the opposite
direction) and is more likely to be an artifact such as a response bias when the
trial is hard.
2. Too small proportion of oblique responses (po < 0.1 ) in the low-contrast trials
at the longest duration (533 ms). At this duration, oblique motion is correctly
perceived by naive observers with a significant probability. Near-absent oblique
perception suggests either a response bias (e.g. due to trial difficulty) or unreli-
able perception at low contrasts.
After data filtering, a 3-way ANOVA on po in the low-contrast trials with factors
session number, duration and gaming status did not reveal an effect of session (first
or second day of the experiment, F1,94 ' 0, p ' 0.99) or an interaction between any
of the factors, thus the data from the two sessions were pooled.
As expected, perception of motion direction was accurate for all 4 (pairwise over-
lapping; see first paragraph of 5.2.1) groups at high contrast, as the proportion of
oblique responses (po) was close to 0.5 in all 3 trial durations with small error bars,
very similar to the respective high-contrast data of the Chapter 3 experiment (Figure
10, left panels).
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At low contrast, in agreement with previous results (Lorenceau et al., 1993; Sotiro-
poulos et al., 2011), all 4 groups show a preference for perpendicular motion, as
evidenced by the low po values seen in Figure 21. The top (A) and bottom (B) panels
show results before and after data filtering, respectively. Contrary to expectations, the
largest difference is seen not between gamers and nongamers but between males and
females. A 2-way ANOVA on po with factors duration and gaming status showed no
effect of gaming status (F1,54 = 0.03, p = 0.867), duration (F2,54 = 0.87, p = 0.426) or
their interaction (F2,54 = 0.34, p = 0.717). The same 2-way ANOVA but with gender in-
stead of gaming status revealed an effect of gender (F1,54 = 4.64, p = 0.036); however,
because the gaming and gender groups overlap, they are not indepenent and there-
fore a correction for multiple comparisons must be performed. A straightforward way
is the Bonferroni correction, which effectively divides α, the significance threshold, by
the number of comparions and thus α = 0.025 and the effect of gender becomes bor-
derline insignificant. Figure 21 shows that the greatest difference between males and
females is in the 532 ms condition. Indeed, a 1-way ANOVA for the 532 ms data with
factors gender shows a borderline significant (after the Bonferroni correction) effect
(F1,17 = 6.17, p = 0.024).
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Figure 21: Experiment 1: proportion of oblique responses (po) of subjects (n = 21) grouped
by gaming experience (10 gamers, 11 nongamers) or gender (13 males, 8 females),
plotted separately for each duration. A, raw data. B, filtered data, after a number
of trials were excluded from analysis according to the pre hoc criteria listed in 5.2.2.
Error bars are standard error of the mean.
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5.2.2.2 Experiment 2 (gratings)
As in Chapter 5, PSE (point of subjective equality) thresholds were averaged over all
staircases for each contrast condition. Since in each trial the reference grating had a
lower contrast than the test grating, I refer to the latter as the “high contrast” grating.
If lower contrast results in higher perceived speed, the ratio of speeds of the high and
low-contrast grating (i.e. the contrast-dependent bias - CDB) should be greater than
one. Figure 22A shows the CDBs for the 21 subjects grouped by gaming experience
and gender. Contrary to initial expectations but in accordance with the results of the
field-of-lines experiment, there is a greater difference in respective CDBs between
males and females than between gamers and nongamers. In the trials with the lowest
contrasts for the two gratings (leftmost panel), CDB is greater than one for the highest
two reference speeds (12 and 16◦/s) in the male and gamer group; in all other cases
CDB remains below one.
Upon detailed inspection of the psychometric data, it was found that, especially at
high reference speeds and low contrasts (which are exactly the conditions where CDB
exceeds unity), some staircases did not converge and furthermore, some staircases
converged at very different PSE values than the rest (in total 6) for that condition.
These abnormal staircases were observed in several subjects and are likely to indicate
random or biased responses when trials are hard, as is the case at low contrasts.
For example, faced with uncertainty about stimulus speeds, subjects may respond
at random or choose the grating with the lowest contrast. To eliminate noise due to
these staircases, the data was filtered with an algorithm that discarded all staircases
that either did not converge (examining the fluctuations in the last 10 trials of the
staircase) or converged to a PSE that was sufficiently different from the average PSE
(across all 6 staircases) for that condition. The definition of “sufficiently different”
that yielded the best results (verified by manual inspection of the data) is a PSE that
differs from the mean PSE by at least 1.15 standard deviations.
Figure 22B shows results from the “clean” data – after all invalid staircases were
removed by the algorithm. The main difference from the raw data are that in the low-
est contrast condition (leftmost panel) all CDBs at 16◦/s are now less than one, with
only the CDB of the male group at 12◦/s exceeding unity, although nonsignificantly
(t53 = 1.45, p = 0.152 for the difference of CDB from 1, t-test). In agreement with
the findings from the experiment of Chapter 4, there is no “null point” where CDB
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crosses the unity line from below (see 5.2.2). Another difference between the raw and
the clean data is that at the highest contrasts (rightmost panel of Figure 22, B) there
is a general (in all groups and at all reference speeds) tendency for CDBs in the clean
data to be lower than the respective ones in the raw data.
The interaction effect of speed and contrast that was observed in the Chapter 4
experiment is also present here, with the exception of the female group. A 2-way
ANOVA on CDB with factors speed and contrast showed that there is a marginally
nonsignificant effect of speed (F4,462 = 2.29, p = 0.059) and no interaction of speed
and contrast (F8,462 = 0.58, p = 0.798) in females. However in males, gamers and
nongamers there is a significant effect of speed (F4,782 = 6.53, p < 0.001; F4,620 = 4.57,
p = 0.002; and F4,624 = 3.5, p = 0.016, respectively) and an interaction of speed and
contrast (F8,782 = 4.95, p < 0.0001; F8,620 = 2.75, p = 0.011; and F8,624 = 2.49; p = 0.023,
respectively). Overall, the effect seen in the Chapter 4 experiment is still present for
speeds up to 12◦/s, although milder and not in all groups: at contrasts below 15%, as
reference speed increases, the effect of contrast on perceived speed diminishes and in
one case even reverses. Higher contrasts (where both gratings have contrasts at least
15%) show the opposite effect: as reference speed increases, low contrast decreases
perceived speed even more strongly. However, at 16◦/s, a speed not tested in the
Chapter 4 experiment, the effect of contrast on perceived speed is again somewhat
stronger, terminating the upward trend of the curves in the leftmost panel of Figure
22B. As in Experiment 1, all statistical reporting in the present experiment includes
the Bonferroni correction.
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Figure 22: Experiment 2: mean ratio of speeds of the high (vHC) and low-contrast (vLC) grat-
ings at the point of subjective equality (PSE), plotted as a function of speed, sep-
arately for each contrast condition. Subjects (n = 21) were grouped by gaming ex-
perience (10 gamers, 11 nongamers) or gender (13 males, 8 females). A, raw data.
B, filtered data, after invalid staircases (those that did not converge or converged
to an abnormal value) were excluded from analysis. Error bars are standard error
of the mean.
By comparing the two experiments, it becomes apparent that the differences in
biases between males and females are congruent: females exhibit more biased per-
ception at low contrasts, seen by the lower po in Experiment 1 (Figure 21, 532 ms
condition) and the lower CDB in Experiment 2 (Figure 22, left and middle panels).
It is therefore reasonable to ask whether this congruence is seen on a subject-by-
subject basis. Assuming that a single speed prior for each subject is used across tasks,
in a similar manner to the light-from-above prior, which applies to different tasks
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(Adams, 2007; see 2.2.2), it is possible that po values from Experiment 1 would correl-
ate with CDB values from Experiment 2 (as a prior that favours slow speeds causes
a decrease in both) on a subject-by-subject basis (such correlations were observed by
Adams, 2007). Pearson’s correlation test, however, did not reveal significant correla-
tions between the po values in the 533 ms condition of Experiment 1 and CDB values
in any of the conditions of Experiment 2 (p > 0.13 for all combinations of reference
speeds and contrast conditions).
5.3 modelling
5.3.1 Methods
The Bayesian model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) used in Chapter 4 was also
applied to this data set; in fact, Experiment 2 provided a useful validation data set
for the purpose of testing my model fitting method, which is different to the method
used by Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006. Details of the model and the fitting methods
are given in 4.3.1. The model was fit to the raw data – not the filtered (“clean”) data
– for two reasons. Firstly, in the clean data all staircases that are considered invalid
have been discarded. As there are 40 trials in each staircase, this resulted in the
elimination of a significant number of trials, several of which may be valid. Since the
fitting method of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) uses all trials, and not just the last trial
of the adaptive staircase (which represents the PSE), this would result in information
loss. Secondly, my fitting method relies on the staircase-to-staircase variability. In
Experiment 2 the raw data consists of just 6 staircases per condition and this number
is smaller in the clean data in some cases. This small number of PSEs per condition
reduces the accuracy of the variance of the PSE on which my fitting method relies to
estimate the likelihood variance. Indeed, by its very nature, the filtering algorithm is
likely to lead to an underestimation of the PSE variance.
5.3.2 Results
Priors and likelihood components are plotted in Figure 23, where differences between
groups can be seen. g(v) values are comparable between males and females under
5.3 modelling 75
both fitting methods; h(c) values are practically identical under my fitting method
(solid curves in Figure 23) but there is a difference around the middle of the contrast
range under the fitting method of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) (dashed curves).
However, under both fitting methods, there is considerable difference in the priors
between males and females as well as between gamers and nongamers: the females
prior is very similar to the gamers prior, decreasing more steeply compared to the
prior of the males and nongamers (which are also very similar). Furthermore, under
the fitting method of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) the priors of all groups except the
gamers increase by a small amount at the highest speed.















































Figure 23: Bayesian model fit to the data of each of the four groups (denoted by different
colours). Dashed lines correspond to the fitting method of Stocker and Simon-
celli (2006); solid lines correspond to my fitting method. Extracted priors p(v) (left
panel); speed-dependent g(v) (middle panel) and contrast-dependent h(c) (right
panel) components of likelihood width σ(v, c) in the Bayesian model. Priors are
unnormalized.
I then compared my method to that of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) and, like
them, I used the likelihood of the data under the fitted model as a performance met-
ric, whereby 100% corresponds to the likelihood of the data when separate Weibull
functions for each condition are fit to it and 0% corresponds to the likelihood under
the random (coin-flipping) model. Averaged over the four groups, the performance
of my fitting method is 96.5% whereas the method of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006)
yields a 98.4% performance. The likelihood components are also similar between the
two methods, the main difference being that the contrast-dependent component of
the likelihood h(c) has lower values with my fitting method. This is offset by the
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greater values of the local slopes a(v) of the prior so that the speed biases are very
similar between the two methods1. The greater a(v) values in my fitting method also
result in steeper priors. Interestingly, with both methods, the priors of gamers are
very similar to those of females, and the priors of nongamers are very similar to
those of males, despite the facts that most gamers are male and that the CDB data
does not show the same similarities between groups. These results are explained by
the group differences in the g(v) component of the likelihood.
As in the Chapter 4 experiment, there was significant interindividual variability in
the reconstructed priors but, unlike the Chapter 4 priors, they decrease much less
steeply with speed. Figure 24 shows the two subjects with the most extreme priors:
one that favours high speeds the most (A), to the point that it is nonmonotonic and
starts to increase beyond 6◦/s; and one that favours low speeds the most (B) and is
monotonic. The raw psychometric data of these two subjects, as well as model fits, are
shown in Figures 42 and 43 in Appendix (8.3). In total, 7 subjects had nonmonotonic
priors extracted with the fitting method of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006); the corres-
ponding number with my fitting method was 5. The local minimum of the prior in
each of these subjects varied but it was always in the range 2− 8◦/s. This range con-
tains the “null point” found by Thompson et al. (2006) (the point where low contrast
switches from resulting in decreased perceived speed to resulting in increased per-
ceived speed) at around 4◦/s. As for the quantitative difference between the priors
in Chapter 4 and the present priors, it is discussed and put in a broader context in
Chapter 7.
1 Equation 13 in Chapter 4 shows that the speed bias at a given speed range is a product of the likelihood
width and the local slope of the prior. Thus for a given speed bias, prior slope and likelihood width are
inversely related.
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Figure 24: Bayesian model components for the two subjects with the least (A) and most (B)
decreasing priors. Dashed lines correspond to the fitting method of Stocker and
Simoncelli (2006); solid lines correspond to my fitting method. Extracted priors
(p(v)) are shown in the left panel; speed-dependent (g(v)) and contrast-dependent
(h(c)) components of likelihood width σ(v, c) are shown in the middle and left
panel, respectively. Subject A is a male; subject B is a female; both are nongamers.
Priors are unnormalized.
5.4 discussion
In Experiment 1, results are in line with previous investigations (Lorenceau et al.,
1993; Sotiropoulos et al., 2011): at low contrast, subjects perceive oblique motion less
often. However, the bias towards perpendicular motion direction is not significantly
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different between gamers and nongamers. Surprisingly, the only significant differ-
ence is in the biases of males and females for the longest duration (533 ms). Assum-
ing that there is indeed a gender difference in contrast-induced biases, it is somewhat
surprising that such a difference is not evident at shorter durations, where stimulus
uncertainty is higher and biases become more apparent. It is also noteworthy that
there is a general (nonsignificant) tendency for po values to be highest at the shortest
duration, and decrease as duration increases. Both of these counterintuitive observa-
tions may be explained by the possibility that at short durations, subjects’ responses
are partly random. That is, beyond a certain point of perceptual uncertainty, subjects
tend to switch to a random response strategy instead of reporting their perception.
As for Experiment 2, the novel interactive effect of reference speed and contrast on
CDB seen in Chapter 4 is also apparent in the present data but is not as pronounced in
all groups. In particular, there is no such interaction in the female group. One reason
for this difference is that in the present experiment, while the number of subjects
was greater (6-11 subjects per group versus 6 subjects in the Chapter 4 experiment),
much less data was collected from each subject; whereas in the Chapter 4 experiment
subjects performed 10 staircases for each condition at low reference speeds and 40
staircases at high speeds, in the present experiment only 6 staircases were performed
per condition and some of them had to be excluded as they were found invalid,
further decreasing the amount of available data. Especially at high speeds, where
speed judgements are less reliable (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; also reflected in the
Bayesian model of Chapter 4 as high g(v) values above 8◦/s, – see Figure 17), a larger
number of staircases than 6 is needed to measure CDB with sufficient accuracy. Thus
it is likely that the present data is insufficient to fully reveal the subtleties observed
in Chapter 4, which is also suggested by the larger error bars in CDB values in Figure
22 (cf. Figure 15).
A comparison of the results of the two experiments shows that the largest dif-
ferences are not between gamers and nongamers but between males and females.
Although the effect of gender is not particularly strong, it is significant in both ex-
periments and, moreover, it is consistent across tasks and supports the hypothesis of
a common speed prior used in both tasks. The reasoning for the latter is as follows:
a larger CDB in females, as found in Experiment 2, implies that either their prior is
different, favouring slow speeds more than the prior of the males does, and/or their
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likelihood is different. The difference in likelihood could be either due to a differ-
ence in signal-to-noise ratio, which would be reflected by higher values of the speed-
dependent component g(v) of the likelihood width σ(v, c), or due to a difference in
the contrast response function, reflected in the difference in the contrast-dependent
component h(c) of the likelihood width. As seen in 5.3.2, the main difference is in the
prior, with the prior of the females favouring slow speed more than the prior of the
males. Assuming that a single speed prior is used in all tasks, the differences in the
prior found in Experiment 2 are also responsible for the perceptual differences found
in Experiment 1, where females perceived oblique motion less often than males (since
oblique perception corresponds to a higher velocity than perpendicular perception).
Could the differences in priors between males and females imply a true gender
difference in motion perception? Gender differences in vision have been consistently
found only in a handful of tasks, and recent literature suggests that the magnitude
of differences has been generally overestimated in earlier research (Voyer et al., 1995).
The most well-studied cases are 3D mental rotation tasks, where observers are shown
two pictures of objects from different viewpoints and are asked to judge whether
the two pictures are of different objects or of the same object viewed from different
viewpoints. In these tasks, males have been found to have an advantage, such as
faster reaction times (Voyer et al., 1995; Kimura, 2000). Mental rotation is a primarily
cognitive task, however; in low-level vision, the majority of research has focused on
colour perception. The results of these colour studies have been inconsistent and
when effects are found, they are small. In general, females have been found to have
slightly wider Rayleigh matching ranges (a measure of colour discrimination ability
where a wider range indicates lower performance) on the red-green colour axis (Birch
et al., 1991). However, as Murray et al. (2012) explain, these differences were mainly
due to the presence of female carriers of X chromosome-linked colour deficiencies
and the most recent study on the topic found that after these female carriers were
excluded from analysis, the sex differences disappeared (Rodriguez-Carmona et al.,
2008). A remarkable case of gender differences in colour perception is the existence of
a fourth cone type in a minority of women. These women have tetrachromatic vision
and a richer colour experience than normal trichromats (Jameson et al., 2001).
Colour differences, however, are unlikely to be related to the differences found in
the present experiments, which manipulate luminance differences (contrast) of grey-
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scale stimuli. To my knowledge, the only study that is potentially relevant to the
present work is by Abramov et al. (2012) who tested subjects with drifting gratings
similar to those in Experiment 2 and found gender differences in the spatio-temporal
contrast sensitivity function and in spatial acuity. In general, males had higher con-
trast sensitivity (defined as the reciprocal of contrast difference threshold) across all
spatial and temporal frequencies in the measured ranges (0.5-12 cycles/◦ and 1-24
Hz, respectively). At the spatial frequency used in Experiment 2 (2 cycles/◦), Ab-
ramov et al. (2012) found that males had a 30% greater contrast sensitivity at stimulus
speeds of 0.5◦/s – a difference that gradually decreased with speed, disappearing at
12◦/s. Males also had approximately 10% greater spatial acuity than females across
all tested temporal frequencies. The differences in spatial acuity found by Abramov
et al. (2012) are unlikely to be responsible for the differences found in the present
work (since the spatial frequency of the gratings was well above acuity thresholds).
Differences in contrast sensitivity, however, cannot be ruled out as a factor. Males
and females in the present work differed in their priors but not in the likelihood
components (where contrast sensitivity differences would be expected to have an ef-
fect); however, it is conceivable that differences in the prior were shaped over years
from subtle differences in contrast sensitivity: after all, in any Bayesian learning scen-
ario, the current posterior (to which the current likelihood contributes) influences
the future prior. Therefore, while the difference in contrast sensitivity may cause a
difference in the likelihood that is too small to measure in the present experiment,
the cumulative differential effect on the prior throughout life may be measurable. An
interesting direction for future experimental work would be to look for correlations
between contrast sensitivity and CDB in both sexes.
Lastly, although the differences in biases between males and females were congru-
ent in the two experiments (females demonstrated a more biased perception at low
contrasts than males), the biases were not correlated in the two experiments on a
subject-by-subject basis. A likely reason for this is the low sensitivity of Experiment
1 which is inherent in its design: a very large number of trials would be needed to
obtain po values precise enough to uncover any possible correlations.
In conclusion, these two experiments provided evidence towards a common origin
of biases in velocity estimation across different paradigms by showing that differences
in biases between groups in one experiment are congruent with differences in the
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other experiment. This evidence in not conclusive however; while the differences
between males and females are statistically significant in both tasks, there are no
subject-by-subject correlations in the observed biases between the two tasks. As a
final note, the reconstructed priors in the present work exhibit significant variability
across subjects, with a small number of subjects even having nonmonotonic priors.
6
S P E C I F I C I T Y A N D R O B U S T N E S S O F T H E L E A R N E D S P E E D
P R I O R
6.1 introduction
The experiment described in Chapter 3 presented evidence in support of a plastic
speed prior. Observers were able to quickly (in about 20 minutes of exposure) learn
a new prior favouring faster speeds than the baseline (start of session) prior did.
Furthermore, this new prior partially persisted until the next experimental session,
indicating a slower component of learning and a relative robustness of this prior to
influences due to exposure to the real world (that presumably has different speed
statistics) between sessions. The three experiments described in this chapter are a
follow-up to this work with the purpose of investigating whether the changes ob-
served across sessions transfer to other motion directions and stimulus orientations
and, in the last experiment, whether the changed prior is long-lasting, as in percep-
tual learning research and the studies of Knill (2007) and Adams et al. (2010).
6.2 general methods
The experiments described here have the same structure as the experiment in Chapter
3, with the addition of two short test blocks at the beginning of the first (day 1) and
last (day 5) sessions. These extra two blocks are similar to the main test blocks (pre-
and post-training blocks of the Chapter 3 experiment) in that stimuli move at low
speed (4◦/s) and have the same number of trials but they differ from the main test
blocks in that the longest duration of presentation (532 ms) is omitted, so the extra
blocks are 33% shorter than the standard test blocks. The rationale for omitting the
longest duration was that biases are smaller in long durations and thus adding such
trials would not be informative and would make sessions unnecessarily long and
possibly undermine any direct comparisons to the original experiment (see 6.6 for a
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discussion). The total number of trials in the extra blocks was 144, compared to 216
in the main test blocks.
The extra blocks were added to see how much learning would transfer to a dif-
ferent line orientation (but with the same motion directions) as well as to different
motion directions (and stimulus orientation). In one of the extra blocks, where direc-
tion was unchanged from the standard blocks, lines were “flipped” vertically so that
downward motion now corresponds to perpendicular motion, whereas upward mo-
tion corresponds to oblique motion, i.e. the opposite of what holds for the standard
blocks. This manipulation also serves as a check for possible response biases. For ex-
ample, if in cases of uncertainty subjects respond with ’Up’ all the time, this will show
up as an abnormally high po (proportion of oblique responses) in the flipped orient-
ation condition whereas in the standard blocks a high proportion of ’Up’ response
would corresponds to low po. In the other extra block, the whole stimulus, includ-
ing its direction, was rotated by 90◦, so that both orientation and direction were at
right angles to their main counterparts (see Figure 25 in Experiment 1). Thus in the
second extra block the equivalent of the oblique direction (which in the main block is
−20◦ clockwise from horizontal) is −20◦ clockwise from vertical. All other stimulus
parameters (contrast values, line and aperture dimensions) were as in the Chapter
3 experiment, as were the rest of the experimental parameters, such as laboratory
environment and computer hardware and software.
As in the previous experiments, experiment participants were all undergraduate or
postgraduate students from the University of Edinburgh.
6.3 experiment 1
6.3.1 Methods
Figure 25 shows the structure of the first and last (fifth) sessions. Sessions 2, 3 and 4
were identical to the experiment of Chapter 3 and consisted of the last 3 blocks (MAIN
condition; red shapes in Figure 25). Sessions 1 and 5 included an additional two
blocks at the beginning of the session – a test block (ORTH) with a stimulus whose
orientation and two motion directions were at right angles to the respective main
orientation and directions (those used in the experiment of Chapter 3), followed by a
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test block (FLIP ORI) with a stimulus whose orientation differed by 40◦ from the main
orientation and whose motion directions were the same as the main directions. Thus
the oblique direction in the latter block is the same as the perpendicular direction in
the main blocks and vice versa. 7 subjects (5 female and 2 male) participated in the
experiment, 2 of whom (both female) had to be excluded post hoc (see 6.3.2).
Figure 25: Block sequence in the first and last session in Experiment 1. Sessions 1 and 5
were identical to the respective sessions in the experiment of Chapter 3, with the
addition of two extra blocks (ORTH followed by FLIP ORI) at the beginning of the
session; sessions 2,3 and 4 were as in the Chapter 3 experiment, i.e. consisted only
of the last 3 blocks.
6.3.2 Results and discussion
Figure 26 summarizes the results of Experiment 1. The red triangles (data points
from the MAIN condition) correspond to the data points in the Chapter 3 experiment;
the green circles and blue squares correspond to the extra blocks (ORTH and FLIP
ORI conditions, respectively). At high contrast (top row of Figure 26) perception is
veridical, as implied by the fact that po values are close to the 0.5 line.
In the low-contrast data of the MAIN condition, a 3-way ANOVA with factors
session number, test block number and duration showed an effect of session (F4,139 =
34.31, p < 0.0001) and test block (F1,139 = 13.04, p = 0.0004) but not an effect of
duration (F2,139 = 2.05, p = 0.155) or any interactions. Thus data from all durations
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was pooled for subsequent analysis. Data from the main test blocks (pre- and post-
training; empty and filled red triangles respectively) follows a similar pattern to the
Chapter 3 experiment but the change in po across sessions is less pronounced. This is
also reflected in the statistical analysis: the upward slope of the linear fit to the data
is significant in the post-training but not in the pre-training block (p = 0.006 and
0.117 respectively, linear hypothesis test). The difference in po between first and last
session is significant in the post-training block (t12 = −2.489, p = 0.028, t-test) but
not in the pre-training block (t12 = −1.09, p = 0.113).
In the extra blocks, neither ORTH (green circles) nor FLIP ORI (blue squares) re-
sponses show any significant change across sessions. Note that there are no post-
training extra blocks in the experiment (for reasons discussed in the first paragraph
of 6.2) and therefore short-term (within-session) effects cannot be observed.
Figure 26: Experiment 1: proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number.
Data from 5 subjects. Top row, high contrast; bottom row, low contrast. Error bars
are SEM (standard error of the mean).
6.3.2.1 Excluded subjects
The above results are after the data from 2 out of 7 subjects were discarded (Figures
27 and 28 show data from these two subjects). The post hoc criteria for data exclusion,
based on pilot data and on the main results from the Chapter 3 experiment, were
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1. Poor performance (< 85%) in at least one block of high-contrast trials, which
suggests unreliable perception or inability to perform the task correctly. A short
familiarization task and a small performance test prior to the main experiment
was performed by all participants and those that failed this pre hoc test were
excluded from the main experiment. However, trials in the pre hoc test had a
longer duration, on average, than even the longest (533 ms) duration used in
the main experiment. This may explain why these two subjects passed the pre
hoc test but were excluded post hoc.
2. Too large proportion of oblique responses (po > 0.7) in the low-contrast trials
(at any duration). Such a high po is highly unlikely to correspond to true per-
ception of oblique motion (since the bias in untrained subject is in the opposite
direction) and is more likely to be an artifact such as a response bias when the
trial is hard.
3. Too small proportion of oblique responses (po < 0.1 ) in the low-contrast trials
at the longest duration (533 ms). At this duration, oblique motion is correctly
perceived by naive observers with a significant probability. Near-absent oblique
perception suggests either a response bias (e.g. due to trial difficulty) or unreli-
able perception at low contrasts.
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Figure 27: Proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number. Data from
excluded subject 1 in Experiment 1. Top row, high-contrast trials; bottom row, low-
contrast trials.
Figure 28: Proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number. Data from
excluded subject 2 in Experiment 1. Top row, high-contrast trials; bottom row, low-
contrast trials.
In conclusion, subjects’ responses in the main test blocks (red triangles in Figure 26)
are very similar to those of the experiment of Chapter 3: po follows an upward trend
both within a session (from pre- to post-training) and across sessions. po in the last
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post-training block exceeds 0.5, i.e. the “perpendicular motion” illusion is reversed
and oblique motion is perceived more often, as seen in the Chapter 3 experiment.
However, the results in the present experiment are statistically weaker. One likely
factor for this is the smaller number of subjects (5) after data from two subjects were
excluded. In contrast to the changes seen in the main blocks, there are no changes
in the extra blocks and thus no transfer of learning to either FLIP ORI or ORTH
(although there is an effect on FLIP ORI in the data from the two excluded subjects).
6.4 experiment 2
The motivation for Experiment 2 was twofold. First, in the previous experiment the
difference between the first and last session in the extra blocks (FLIP ORI and ORTH)
was not significant. I thus decided to repeat the experiment and gather additional
data that might shed more light on the situation. Second, I wanted to investigate
whether there is a systematic difference in perception between the vertical and hori-
zontal directions. Anisotropies between horizontal and vertical motion direction have
been reported previously: Loffler and Orbach (2001) found a strong attractive bias to-
wards horizontal directions (directions with a small deviation from horizontal were
perceived as horizontal). Such a bias is expected to blur the difference between per-
ceived directions very close to either side of the horizontal and thus influence results
in a different way than it would if motion directions were around the vertical in-
stead. Thus repeating Experiment 1 with the entire moving stimulus (line orientation,
direction of motion) rotated by 90◦ could conceivably yield different results.
6.4.1 Methods
Figure 29 shows the structure of the first and last sessions. The line orientation and
motion directions in the ORTH block are now identical to the orientation and direc-
tions of the main blocks in Experiment 1. Line orientation and directions in the FLIP
ORI block and main blocks are 90◦ counter-clockwise to their respective counterparts
in Experiment 1. As before, sessions 2, 3 and 4 consisted of the last 3 blocks in Figure
29 (main blocks). 9 subjects (5 female, 4 male) participated in the experiment; data
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from 3 subjects (2 female, 1 male) had to be discarded according to the same criteria
as those in Experiment 1.
Figure 29: Block sequence in the first and last session in Experiment 2. Sessions 2 through 4
were as in the Chapter 3 experiment, i.e. consisted only of the last 3 blocks.
6.4.2 Results and discussion
Figure 30 summarizes the results of Experiment 2. In high-contrast trials (top panel),
results are as expected and very similar to those of Experiment 1. In low-contrast
trials of the MAIN condition, a 3-way ANOVA with factors session number, test block
number and duration showed an effect of session (F4,209 = 7.15, p < 0.0001) and test
block (F1,209 = 15.28, p = 0.0001) but not an effect of duration (F2,139 = 1.12, p = 0.328)
or any interactions. Thus data from all durations was pooled for subsequent analysis.
Data from the main test blocks (pre- and post-training) shows both short-term (within
session) and long-term (across sessions) learning. Results follow a similar pattern to
Experiment 1, where the change in po across sessions is less pronounced in the pre-
training block. This is also reflected in the statistical analysis: the upward slope of the
linear fit to the data is significant in the post-training but not in the pre-training block
(p = 0.005 and 0.095 respectively, linear hypothesis test). The change in po between
first and last session is significant in the post-training (t12 = −3.35, p = 0.006) but
not in the pre-training (t12 = −1.53, p = 0.152) block.
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Figure 30: Experiment 2: proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number.
Data from 6 subjects. Top row, high contrast; bottom row, low contrast. Error bars
are SEM.
In the extra blocks, the results are different from Experiment 1. In contrast to the
absence of change in po in FLIP ORI of Experiment 1, there is now a visible increase
in po from session 1 to session 5 in FLIP ORI. A 2-way ANOVA with factors session
number and duration shows an effect of session (F1,27 = 11.78, p = 0.002) but no
effect of duration (F1,27 = 0.36, p = 0.553), therefore data from both durations was
pooled. A t-test showed that the difference in po between session 1 and 5 is significant
(t12 = −2.68, p = 0.019). The po values in FLIP ORI (blue squares in Figure 30) are
comparable to the respective (first and last session) values in the main pre-training
block (empty red triangles in Figure 30). Thus, in contrast to Experiment 1, there is
evidence that the learned prior was applied to the different stimulus orientation.
Data in the ORTH block is quite different from main and FLIP ORI blocks, as po is
unusually high in both sessions (1 and 5). Looking at individual subject data, these
high po values are due to two subjects, shown in Figures 31 and 32. It is not clear
why these subjects reported mostly oblique perception in the ORTH block; block
ordering effects (e.g. due to motion adaptation) are unlikely given that the ORTH
block was presented first. As before, the results in the ORTH block may reflect a
response bias employed in trials that the subjects found too hard, although this does
not explain why they only used this strategy in that block. Figure 33 shows the data
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remaining after excluding the ORTH block data from these two subjects. po values in
the ORTH block are now comparable to the respective values of the main and FLIP
ORI blocks, although there is a (nonsignificant) tendency towards higher values. A
2-way ANOVA with factors session number and duration showed no effect of session
number (F1,19 = 0.15, p = 0.705), duration (F1,19 = 0.28, p = 0.606) or an interaction
(F1,19 = 0.03, p = 0.863).
Figure 31: Experiment 2: proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number.
Data from the first subject with an unusually high po in the ORTH block. Top row,
high contrast; bottom row, low contrast.
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Figure 32: Experiment 2: proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number.
Data from the second subject with an unusually high po in the ORTH block. Top
row, high contrast; bottom row, low contrast.
Figure 33: Experiment 2: proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number.
Data from 6 subjects, after excluding the ORTH block data from 2 subjects with
unusually high po in that block (leaving 4 subjects in that block). Top row, high
contrast; bottom row, low contrast. Error bars are SEM.
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6.5 experiment 3
In light of the somewhat inconsistent results of Experiments 1 and 2, I decided to
collect more data with the same stimulus setup as Experiment 2 but with the order of
ORTH and FLIP ORI blocks swapped (so that FLIP ORI is performed first, then ORTH
and then the main blocks). Would the counterintuitive results of the ORTH block in
two subjects (Figures 31 and 32) still be observed? Furthermore, if there is indeed an
ordering effect, would we see a difference in the FLIP ORI block between the two
experiments? Conceivable reasons for an ordering effect are motion adaptation or
greater familiarization with the task between the first and second extra blocks.
Additionally, the specificity of learning suggested by these two experiments is re-
miniscent of perceptual learning. Apart from specificity, another hallmark of percep-
tual learning is its persistence in time. Is the learning observed in Experiments 1 and
2 similarly persistent? If subjects were tested again a week after the fifth session, how
would their responses compare to those of the first week?
6.5.1 Methods
The experiment consisted of 6 sessions: 5 consecutive ones (Monday-Friday) as in
Experiments 1 and 2; and a 6th session a week later (next Friday), identical to the
first session. In sessions 1, 5 and 6 (Figure 34) the extra blocks (FLIP ORI and ORTH)
were identical to the respective blocks in Experiment 2 except that their order was
swapped: FLIP ORI was presented first, followed by ORTH, followed by the main
blocks. Sessions 2, 3 and 4 were identical to the respective sessions of Experiment 2.
7 subjects (3 female, 4 male) participated in the experiment; data from 2 subjects (1
male, 1 female) had to be discarded according to the criteria described in 6.3.2.
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Figure 34: Block sequence in the first, fifth and last (week-after) session in Experiment 3.
Sessions 1 and 5 were identical to the respective sessions in Experiment 2 except
that the order of the two extra blocks was swapped (thus FLIP ORI was followed by
ORTH). Sessions 2,3 and 4 were identical to the respective sessions of Experiment
2.
6.5.2 Results and discussion
Figure 35 summarizes the results of Experiment 3. Results for the main test blocks
(red triangles) are similar to Experiment 2, with the change in po being less pro-
nounced in the short term (within session, between pre- and post-training) in the
longest two durations (266 and 532 ms). In the long-term (across sessions) there is
an upward tendency in po across sessions for both test blocks. A 3-way ANOVA
with factors session number, block number and duration showed an effect of ses-
sion (F4,149 = 9.72, p < 0.0001) and block (F1,149 = 5.61, p = 0.019), as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2; however, this time there was also an effect of duration (F2,149 = 6.45,
p = 0.002) as well as a borderline nonsignificant interaction of block number and dur-
ation (F2,149 = 2.08, p = 0.129). Further analysis (repeating the ANOVA on subsets of
the {133,266,532} ms data set) showed that it was the shortest (133 ms) duration that
differed from the rest and that test block number had an effect only on that condi-
tion. Thus linear hypothesis tests were performed seperately for the 133 ms and for
the pooled 266+532 ms data. In the 133 ms condition, there is a significant upward
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tendency in the pre-training block (p = 0.004, linear hypothesis test) and a borderline
significant tendency in the post-training block (p = 0.049). In the 266+532 ms condi-
tions, the upward tendency is highly significant in both the pre-training (p = 0.0001)
and post-training (p = 0.0004) blocks. Therefore, long-term learning occurred in both
the 133 ms and the pooled 266+532 ms conditions.
Notably, there is also a significant difference in po between session 1 and 6 (the
week-later session) in the pre-training blocks of the 133 ms (t8 = −2.42, p = 0.042)
and the 266+532 ms (t8 = −3.61, p = 0.007) conditions. As for the post-training
blocks, the difference between session 1 and 6 is significant at 266+532 ms (t8 = −2.64,
p = 0.029) and borderline nonsignificant at 133 ms (t8 = −1.78, p = 0.113). Overall,
these results indicate that learning persisted for at least a week after the fifth session.
Figure 35: Experiment 3: proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number.
Data from 5 subjects. Top row, high contrast; bottom row, low contrast. Error bars
are SEM.
In the extra blocks, there is a small tendency for increase in po in the FLIP ORI
blocks but the values remain generally low. However, po in the ORTH blocks are
unusually high (and with high variance), as was the case in Experiment 2. Looking
again at individual data, these results were due to two subjects (both male), shown
in Figures 36 and 37.
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Figure 36: Experiment 3: proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number.
Data from the first subject with an unusually high po in the ORTH block. Top row,
high contrast; bottom row, low contrast.
Figure 37: Experiment 3: proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number.
Data from the second subject with an unusually high po in the ORTH block. Top
row, high contrast; bottom row, low contrast.
The ORTH block data is again counterintuitive, especially considering that no such
effect is seen in the FLIP ORI block and, furthermore, that the ORTH block in this
experiment (and in Experiment 2) corresponds exactly to the main test blocks in the
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Chapter 3 experiment. Order of presentation is a highly unlikely explanation for the
unusually high po, considering that in this experiment the ORTH block is presented
after the FLIP ORI block.
Figure 38 shows the remaining data, after excluding the ORTH block data from
the two subjects shown in Figures 36 and 37. For the latter subject (Figure 37), the
FLIP ORI data was also excluded as it failed the third post hoc criterion described in
6.3.2 (too small proportion of oblique responses). Thus Figure 38 shows data from 3
subjects in the ORTH condition and 4 subjects in the FLIP ORI condition.
2-way ANOVAs on the remaining data (separately for the FLIP ORI and ORTH
conditions) with factors session number and duration showed no main effects or
interactions (all p > 0.122). However, Figure 38 shows a moderate change in the FLIP
ORI condition between session 1 and 5/6 in the 266 ms condition, suggesting possible
transfer of learning from main to FLIP ORI. Therefore the ANOVA was followed up
by t-tests for the difference between session 1 and 5 and session 1 and 6 in the 266 ms
condition (using the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons). No significant
differences were found between any of the comparisons (t8 = 0.68, p = 0.513 for the
difference between session 1 and 5 and t8 = 0.52, p = 0.619 for the difference between
session 1 and 6).
Figure 38: Experiment 3: proportion of oblique responses (po) as a function of session number.
Data from 5 subjects, after excluding the ORTH block data from 2 subjects with
unusually high po in that block (leaving 4 subjects in that block). Top row, high
contrast; bottom row, low contrast. Error bars are SEM.
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6.6 general discussion
In general, the three experiments presented in this chapter yielded quantitatively sim-
ilar results and reproduced the findings of Chapter 3: subjects were able to internalize
the speed statistics of the stimulus ensemble, which led to a shift in perceived direc-
tion. Furthermore, the present experiments extended previous findings through the
inclusion of additional testing conditions.
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that the order of presentation of the
two extra blocks is not important. These results were also similar to Experiment 1;
there was a qualitative similarity in the direction of the observed biases between
near-horizontal (Experiment 1) and near-vertical (Experiments 2 and 3) directions.
This implies that, unlike the horizontal/vertical anisotropies observed by Loffler and
Orbach (2001), the perceptual biases observed with this task do not depend on the
absolute orientation or directions of the stimulus, at least among the cardinal axes.
In contrast to the main blocks, there is no change between the first and the last
session in the ORTH blocks in any of the three experiments. A possible explanation
for this is that different priors are used for different stimulus configurations, i.e. the
learned prior is highly specific to stimulus details. Evidence for the specificity of
learned priors comes from the work of Kerrigan and Adams (2013), where subjects
learned a different light prior for different contexts (where context was the illumina-
tion colour). Another possible reason for the absence of transfer of the learned prior
to the extra blocks in some subjects may be the relatively small size (i.e. number of
trials) of the (main and extra) test blocks. This might also explain the lack of signific-
ant change in the main test blocks in some cases: the number of trials in these blocks
may be too small to allow for the discrimination of real effects from noise. This is
an unavoidable trade-off in the experiment: the size of the test blocks must be large
enough to provide sufficient data but not so large as to have a significant training ef-
fect (by exposing subjects to low speeds too frequently and reverting the high-speed
bias induced by the training block).
The absence of transfer to FLIP ORI in some subjects suggests that while most sub-
jects consider the two orientations (main and FLIP ORI) similar enough, some do not.
The criteria for similarity of different observers are unclear at this point; it is likely
though that a number of different, interacting criteria are used. For example, Gekas
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et al. (2013) found that the learned prior on motion direction generalized across stim-
ulus colours but only when there were no statistical regularities in the non-trained
colour. Additionally, Seydell et al. (2010) found transfer of the shape-isotropy prior
across colours but not across shapes (subjects were able to learn separate priors for
each shape). Future research studying a large number of subjects exposed to an array
of different stimulus and task configurations should be able to shed more light in the
complexities of specificity in the learning of priors.
One potential complication in interpreting differences between conditions is the
fact that the stimulus used in these experiments (and that of Chapter 3) exhibits a
large-scale spatial structure that it was not apparent to me at the time of the experi-
ments. In particular, the stimulus has the potential to evoke the perception of illusory
contours. These are perceived visual borders which are not associated with lumin-
ance or colour changes across the border (Petry and Meyer, 1987). A famous example
of an illusory contour is Kanizsa’s triangle (Figure 39), named after the Italian psy-
chologist who first described it (Kanizsa, 1955). The illusory contours in the present
stimulus can be recognized by drawing imaginary lines that connect the endpoints
of adjacent lines along the oblique direction, for the stimuli in the main and ORTH
conditions. The black space between these imaginary lines can be seen as such an
illusory contour. The orientation of the contour is the same as the oblique motion
direction. For example, in the stimulus depiction in the main condition of Figure 38,
one such illusory contour is just to the left of the northeast-pointing arrow, parallel
to it. In contrast, in the FLIP ORI condition, the orientation of the illusory contour is
perpendicular to the oblique direction. Therefore, in the main and ORTH conditions,
the illusory contour is stationary in trials with oblique motion and could be used as
a frame of reference (whereas in trials with perpendicular motion the contour moves
obliquely to its orientation). In the FLIP ORI condition, the contour moves in all tri-
als and is less likely to be perceived. Whether such an effect explains the differences
between FLIP ORI and ORTH in the 133 ms condition in Experiments 2 and 3 (Fig-
ures 33 and 38) is unknown at this point, although somewhat unlikely, given that the
FLIP ORI data, in the cases that it differs from the ORTH data, is similar to the (pre-
test) main data. It would be straightforward and potentially interesting to compare
the results obtained with the current stimulus and with a stimulus where illusory
contours are avoided (e.g. by adding positional jitter to the line elements).
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Figure 39: Kanizsa’s triangle showing illusory contours. When the relative position and ori-
entation of 3 “pacmen” is as shown in panel A, the resulting percept is a white
triangle superimposed on 3 black circles. The triangle’s sides are “seen” even in
the gaps between the pacmen. In panel B, no such percept is produced due to the
different orientation of the pacmen.
Although the degree of specificity of the learned prior with respect to stimulus con-
figurations is debatable and likely varies among observers, the learned prior appears
to be context-specific and may not be used outside the laboratory. This is suggested
by the results of Experiment 3, where exposure to the motion statistics of everyday
life over a week did not revert the experimentally induced prior. The observed per-
sistence of learning is in accordance with the majority of the perceptual learning
literature as well as with the finding of Adams et al. (2010) that the changed light-
from-above prior persisted for at least 4 days after the end of the experiment.
The results in this chapter are thus broadly consistent with the hypothesis that
subjects use the learned prior in a highly specific manner: not only the context must
be the same (as suggested by the absence of transfer to ORTH and the persistence
of learning after a week); stimulus parameters (such as orientation) must also be
sufficiently similar.
7
D I S C U S S I O N
In this chapter, I review the experimental and theoretical work that has been presen-
ted in this thesis and put it in perspective. I also discuss the limitations of this work
and outline possible future directions that may address these limitations.
7.1 limitations
7.1.1 Reconstruction of the changing prior
The limitations of the experimental paradigm of Chapters 3 and 6 were discussed in
3.4, where it was argued that the experimental paradigm and the associated Bayesian
model limit accuracy and precision in reconstructing the speed prior and studying
its dynamics – how the prior changes within and across sessions. For example, in-
creased precision in prior reconstruction would improve our understanding of how
the prior partially “reverts” between the end of a training block and the beginning
of the next (day-after), i.e. as subjects are exposed to the statistics of their everyday
life; or, alternatively, how the rapidly (within-session) learned prior is partially con-
solidated between training blocks (the consolidation hypothesis seems more likely in
light of the discussion in 7.2.2). Precisely tracking the changing prior was one of the
aims of the experiment described in Chapter 4; however, no learning was observed
in this experiment. Possible reasons for this were discussed in 4.4. Briefly, these reas-
ons are based on the differences between the experimental paradigms of Chapters 3
and 4: the greater stimulus variety in terms of speed and contrast; and the explicit
(and therefore more prone to cognitive interference) nature of speed judgements in
Chapter 4.
Further investigation into the reasons for this failure could provide useful insights
and help design experiments that combine the best of both worlds: an effective train-
ing procedure to change the prior (Chapter 3) within an experimental and theoretical
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framework that enables the accurate reconstruction of the prior (Chapter 4). An ex-
periment that might satisfy these criteria would be one using plaid (superpositions of
gratings) stimuli. The slow speed prior has been successfully used to model how per-
ceived direction of moving plaids depends on the speed, contrast and direction of the
component gratings (Weiss and Adelson, 1998; Weiss et al., 2002; Hedges et al., 2011).
By exposing subjects to fast-moving plaids, it might be possible to induce a shift in
the prior similar to that of Chapter 3, which would cause a shift in the perceived
direction of slow-moving plaids. This experiment would avoid explicit speed judge-
ments and, at the same time, would allow the application of the model of Stocker and
Simoncelli (2006) and thus the precise reconstruction of the changing speed prior. If
this experiment proved successful in changing the speed prior, it would also be inter-
esting to test (but not train) these subjects with the field-of-lines stimuli of Chapter 3.
This could shed more light in the matter of specificity of the speed priors.
7.1.2 Bayesian models
The Bayesian models of motion perception examined in the present work provide a
satisfactory account of the experimental findings quantitatively but also conceptually,
as these models view perception as a principled process of unconscious inference
and recast certain motion illusions as a result of the workings of a visual system
that performs optimally on average. However, as any model, they are not without
limitations. The limitations of the Bayesian model of Chapter 3, which is an extension
of the Weiss et al. (2002) model, are discussed in 2.2.3.2, where I also describe how
the model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) was designed to overcome several of these
limitations and, importantly, to allow a less constrained reconstruction of the speed
prior.
One of the main motivations for the development of the model of Stocker and
Simoncelli (2006) was to naturally (without additional assumptions about decision
noise) account for trial-to-trial variability. In fact, the model uses that variability
to separate the effects of the likelihood and the prior on the posterior (which cor-
responds to perception). The experimental data collected from the speed matching
experiments in Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) and in Chapters 4 and 5 can be sum-
marized in the form of a psychometric function, which is modelled by Equation 15.
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For a given stimulus speed, the contrast-dependent bias (CDB) in perceived speed
determines the location of the psychometric function whereas the trial-to-trial vari-
ability determines the slope. The perceived speed biases and variances are functions
of stimulus speed (v), slope of the prior (a) and likelihood width (σ(v, c) = g(v)h(c))
given by Equations 13 and 14. Relying on the speed bias alone, which is a product
of the likelihood width and the prior slope, would make impossible the disambigu-
ation of the contribution of the prior and likelihood. Such disambiguation is made
possible by also taking into account the slope of the psychometric function, which
can be shown to only depend on the likelihood width (see 8.1.3 in Appendix).
In theory, the aforementioned considerations should allow the reliable reconstruc-
tion of the prior. However, the results of Chapters 4 and 5 show that the reconstructed
priors can be very different from one experiment to another: whereas the means and
variances of CDBs are less than 50% different on average between the two experi-
ments (at the reference speeds that are common to the two experiments, i.e. 4, 8 and
12◦/s), the group prior in Chapter 4 is almost three orders of magnitude steeper than
the priors of the four groups in Chapter 5 (see Figures 17 and 23). The priors in
both experiments are also less steep than those in Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) and
Hedges et al. (2011). A possible reason for the differences between the present work
and the aforementioned two studies is the differences in stimuli: in my experiments I
followed Thompson et al. (2006) and used only one spatial frequency whereas Stocker
and Simoncelli (2006) used broadband gratings and Hedges et al. (2011) used plaids.
However, stimulus differences cannot explain the differences between the priors of
Chapters 4 and 5; stimuli were identical, with the exception of the reference speed
range, which in Chapter 5 extended up to 16◦/s, compared to 12◦/s in Chapter 4.
It is thus remarkable that the extracted priors differ to such degree. The difference
between the priors of Chapter 5 on one hand and the priors of Chapter 4 and those
in Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) and Hedges et al. (2011) on the other hand suggest
that the model is sensitive to noise in the data (and thus to the amount of collec-
ted data, which was significantly less in Chapter 5 compared to Chapter 4) but also
to experimental parameters, such as the number and range of reference speeds. At
this point, it is worth noting that the experiments of Chapters 4 and 5 differed from
the experiment of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) in another way: the direction (left or
right) of drift of the gratings was the same for the two gratings in each trial but varied
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randomly across trials. In contrast, in my experiments, gratings drifted always to the
right. It is possible that subjects’ perception of speed is influenced by the knowledge
of direction of motion; even in one-dimensional motion, such as in the present ex-
periment, knowing that the gratings always drift to the right could lead an observer
to ignore all evidence for the opposite direction. Stocker and Simoncelli (2008) argue
that a similar phenomenon underlies certain repulsive biases in motion perception,
such as those observed in Jazayeri and Movshon (2007). However, this issue is un-
likely to be of relevance in the present experiment, in which the lowest reference
speed used is 1◦/s: such speed is well above the speed discrimination threshold in
humans (typically 0.3-0.4◦/s, Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006) and thus noise in visual
measurements would be extremely unlikely to lead to a negative measurement as
that would imply an error greater than 1◦/s.
Thus, although the model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) offers a substantial im-
provement over that of Weiss et al. (2002), and although the combination of the ratio
model of Thompson et al. (2006) with that of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) presented
in Chapter 4 can better account for certain interactive effects of speed and contrast,
care should be taken in the choice of experimental parameters for the models to
provide reliable quantitative estimates of subjects’ speed priors, especially in cases
when psychophysical data is not abundant. Additionally, in my opinion, there is
need for further work (which I would have done given more time) towards a more
complete model that would combine the strengths of the models of Stocker and Si-
moncelli (2006) (a non-parametric prior; realistic noise and contrast response models;
the use of signal detection theory), Weiss and Adelson (1998) (global integration of
complex, non-rigid motion) and Thompson et al. (2006) (physiologically grounded
model of speed tuning).
7.2 relation to other work
7.2.1 Motion direction perception and locus of the speed prior
The series of experiments presented in this thesis fall into two paradigms: one where
observers are asked to judge the direction of a field of moving lines and one where
observers are asked to compare the speeds of drifting gratings. In Chapters 3 and 6
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we saw that directional judgements of low-contrast (and therefore high-uncertainty)
low-speed stimuli can change after exposure to a large number of high-speed stim-
uli. This change occurs in a way consistent with the hypothesis that observers adjust
their internal statistics of motion speed (their speed prior) to better match the stim-
ulus statistics and that this adjustment causes a shift in perceived direction (through
the relationship between speed and direction in two-dimensional visual motion). The
exposure-related change attenuates (and in some cases even reverses) the well-known
tendency of observers to perceive the direction of a moving line as being perpendic-
ular to the line when perceptual uncertainty is high, which is the case when the
duration of motion or the contrast of the moving stimulus are low. Previous invest-
igations have attributed this perpendicular bias to the fact that the receptive fields
(RFs) of motion-sensing neurons (such as those found in areas V1 and MT of the
visual cortex) are small and thus cannot fit the entire moving line, instead “seeing”
part of the line (Pack and Born, 2001). This is the neuronal manifestation of the aper-
ture problem, depicted in Figure 4, whereby a neuron’s RF is akin to an aperture:
the direction of a moving line longer than the receptive field diameter is ambiguous
because its endpoints fall outside the RF. To recover the true direction, ambiguous
motion signals from such neurons must be integrated with signals from neurons
whose small RF contains one of the line terminators or from neurons with large RFs
that are end-stopped, i.e. their RF consists of an excitatory (facilitatory) region flanked
by inhibitory (suppressive) regions (Figure 40). Lorenceau et al. (1993) suggested that
such integration occurs at different time scales for different contrasts and in particu-
lar is slower at low contrasts. This hypothesis accounts for the authors’ findings, as
well as the findings at the beginning of the experiments of Chapters 3 and 6 in the
present thesis: perceived direction tends to be perpendicular to line orientation at the
beginning of the trial (or throughout the trial if it is short) but gradually changes
to the veridical direction. This change is reflected in observers’ responses (as well as
their eye movements, Pack and Born, 2001) at longer trial durations.
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Figure 40: A, a small aperture (dotted circle) positioned at the centre of a moving bar allows
detection of only the rightward component of motion (light grey arrow), regardless
of the actual motion direction (dark grey arrows). However, an aperture positioned
at the endpoint of the bar permits measurement of the correct motion direction. B,
an end-stopped cell responds poorly to a long bar centered on the receptive field,
because the bar stimulates both the excitatory (dotted oval) and inhibitory (shaded
oval) regions of the receptive field. However, the same end-stopped neuron re-
sponds better to the endpoint, because only part of the inhibitory region is stimu-
lated. Adapted from Pack et al. (2003)
However, we saw in Chapters 3 and 6 that with exposure to high speeds, this initial
bias towards perpendicular direction progressively decreases. Can such a decrease be
explained within the framework of Lorenceau et al. (1993)? Would the effect of con-
trast on the time scale of motion integration depend on prior exposure to fast motion?
This question, to my knowledge, has not been satisfactorily answered. The Bayesian
explanation for the results in Chapters 3 and 6 is that the brain combines sensory
input from motion-sensitive neurons with prior expectations to infer the stimulus
velocity. This explanation accounts for the fact that it is fast motion in particular that
can cause the change in bias (because exposure to fast motion changes the prior on
slow speeds). However, the Bayesian models described in this work are not formu-
lated on the neural implementation level (Marr and Poggio, 1976) and thus make no
mention of where exactly the priors are encoded; as Seriès and Seitz (2013) note, it
is not clear “whether (all) prior expectations correspond to top-down signals mod-
ulating early visual pathways, whether they reside entirely in higher-level areas, or
on the contrary whether they are formed in sensory cortex itself”. Thus it is not pos-
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sible at present to exclude the possibility that a mechanism akin to that suggested by
Lorenceau et al. (1993) is in operation; for example, the prior may be encoded in the
way that the non-end-stopped neurons from various channels (i.e. tuned to various
speeds or temporal frequencies) are pooled. Pooling of neuronal responses is in fact
thought to occur in the middle temporal area (area MT aka V5) and account for the
high perceptual sensitivity that is seen in laboratory animals: for example, monkeys
have typically lower psychometric thresholds in speed discrimination tasks than do
individual neurons or even entire populations of neurons in MT (Liu and Newsome,
2005). Pooling and integration of non-end-stopped neurons may happen earlier than
the integration with the unambiguous signals from the end-stopped neurons that
process line terminators (Lorenceau et al., 1993). The changing prior may correspond
to changes in early integration of non-end-stopped neurons. This may at least partly
explain the observation that, at low contrasts, the direction bias is attenuated due
to exposure to fast speeds, even at the shortest durations used in Lorenceau et al.
(1993) and in Chapters 3 and 6. Alternatively, or complementarily, the speed prior
may be encoded in the tuning properties of individual neurons; for example, Liu
and Newsome (2005) found that the proportion of high-pass neurons (i.e. neurons
that prefer high speeds) in MT increased in a monkey after extensive exposure to
high-speed stimuli. This shift in preferred speeds was hypothesized to help primar-
ily with speed discrimination but a role of such a shift in the encoding of the speed
prior cannot be ruled out.
While the encoding of the speed prior in the responses of early sensory areas (such
as V1) is not unlikely, the two-stage model presented in Chapter 4, which is able to
account for certain subtleties of speed perception (see 4.3.2), fits more naturally to the
assumption that the prior is encoded at a level higher than V1. The first stage, which
is an instantiation of the ratio model of Thompson et al. (2006), has been proposed to
model speed tuning of MT neurons as a result of the integration of motion-sensitive
V1 neurons; the Bayesian model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) is then used to
combine the output of the ratio model (which is taken to represent the likelihood)
with the prior in order to derive a speed estimate based on the posterior. This lat-
ter stage presumably takes place in higher areas, such as the MT or later. It must
be noted, however, that the conceptual order of the ratio and Bayesian models pro-
posed in Chapter 4 need not correspond to the actual order in which computations
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are performed in the visual hierarchy. In short, the prior and the likelihood may or
may not be encoded in the same area; the available evidence to date is inconclus-
ive. An overview of the possible loci of learned priors in the visual cortex, based
on results from electrophysiological studies as well as studies employing electroen-
cephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), is given by
Seriès and Seitz (2013).
As a final note, the Bayesian models presented in this thesis make no assumptions
regarding the way inferences are implemented in the brain. This is an area of active
research, mostly divided between two main theories. One of them, called probabilistic
population codes, maintains that the activity of a population of neurons represents the
posterior probability over a particular stimulus property (Ma et al., 2006, 2008; Beck
et al., 2008). The other theory maintains that posterior probabilities are represented
in the brain with a sampling code, where neuronal responses correspond to samples of
the posterior (Hoyer and Hyvarinen, 2003; Fiser et al., 2010). While both theories have
received experimental support, the evidence is far from conclusive for either theory. It
would be interesting to study whether priors are encoded in one of these ways. In the
case of the speed prior, the most promising area to look for such populations would
be MT, as speed-tuned neurons are primarily found in this area (whereas motion-
sensitive neurons in V1 are mostly tuned to temporal frequency and direction).
7.2.2 Specificity of priors
Whether learned priors are highly specific to stimulus configurations or whether
(and to what extent) they can be applied to different configurations was examined
in Chapter 6. It was found that subjects, on average, can use the learned prior in
configurations similar to the trained one – in particular, with stimuli with a small
difference in orientation but moving in the same directions as the trained ones (FLIP
ORI condition – see 6.3.1). Transfer of learning to the FLIP ORI condition was not
seen in all subjects however; the possible reasons for this were discussed in 6.6.
What does partial transfer of learning imply for the priors represented in the brain?
On one hand, the generalization of the learned prior to the FLIP ORI condition sug-
gests a common prior that is applied to different (but not too different) configurations.
This is in agreement with results from the literature on the light-from-above prior,
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where it was found that the same prior is used in a variety of stimuli and tasks, such
as in a shape-from-shading task with two different stimuli (Adams et al., 2004) as
well as a shape-from-shading, a visual search and reflectance task (Adams, 2007, also
see Figure 6). The experiment of Chapter 5 also provides evidence for the hypothesis
of a single prior: the biases of the female group were different from those of the male
group in the same way in both experiments. In particular, contrast had a greater effect
on perceived motion speed and direction in females than in males and the modelling
of these biases revealed differences in the prior (and not the likelihood).
On the other hand, the prior learned in the Chapter 6 experiments did not transfer
to stimuli with orientation and directions that were orthogonal to the trained one
(ORTH condition), and for some subjects it did not even transfer to FLIP ORI. If the
new speed prior is stimulus-specific, does this mean that there is a “default” speed
prior (which favours slow speeds) that is applied to novel stimuli and which can be
overridden in a context-specific manner? The evidence from Chapter 6 points towards
an affirmative answer in two ways. First, the specificity of the learned prior, which
generalizes at most to the FLIP ORI condition, implies that the initial prior continues
to apply to the other conditions (ORTH and, for some subjects, FLIP ORI) while
observers are learning the specific prior. Second, the finding that the learned prior
persists for at least a week after the last training session (Experiment 3 of Chapter
6) implies that exposure to the speed statistics of everyday life did not revert the
prior, even partially – in agreement with the persistence of learned priors observed
in previous work (the isotropy prior in Knill, 2007 and the light-from-above prior in
Adams et al., 2010). If there was a single speed prior we would expect an interference
of everyday experience on the experimentally induced prior during the course of a
week, given the results in Chapter 3 and 6, which suggest that experience can modify
the speed prior. For these two reasons, it is likely that the brain can represent multiple,
context-specific priors – a hypothesis that is consistent with previous work on other
types of priors, such as the study of Gekas et al. (2013), who found that observers can
represent two different stimulus-specific priors for motion direction, and the study of
Seydell et al. (2010), who presented similar findings in the case of the isotropy prior
(see 2.2.2).
In summary, a plausible hypothesis that reconciles the specificity and lack of in-
terference found in Chapter 6 and in previous work (Knill, 2007; Adams et al., 2010;
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Seydell et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013; Kerrigan and Adams, 2013) with the congru-
ence between the priors in the two experiments of Chapter 5 as well as in previous
work (Adams et al., 2004; Adams, 2007) is that there is a “default” prior, possibly
innate or shaped during development, that is nevertheless able to spawn context-
specific priors that the brain can represent alongside the default one. The present
work provides preliminary evidence towards this hypothesis; further work will be
necessary to confirm or refute it.
7.2.3 Relation to other types of learning
Both short-term (within-session) and long-term (across sessions) learning effects were
observed in Chapters 3 and 6. The short-term effects are consistent with the the dy-
namics of statistical learning, which can be very fast, occurring over minutes (Fiser
and Aslin, 2001). Such effects are also seen in the learning of priors for motion direc-
tion (Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013) and lighting direction (Adams et al., 2004).
The long-term learning seen in Chapters 3 and 6 is reminiscent of perceptual learning,
which typically progresses over days (Karni and Sagi, 1993), and of the study of Knill
(2007) on the plasticity of the object isotropy prior. These different timescales of prior
learning and its similarities to other learning types raise interesting questions about
the relationship between prior learning, statistical/associative learning and percep-
tual learning. For example, specificity, which has been considered the hallmark of
perceptual learning, is also observed in the learning of priors. At the same time, how-
ever, the learned priors can generalize to other stimuli/contexts under certain condi-
tions. Could this be the case for perceptual learning too? Interestingly, recent research
suggests that it could. For example, retinal location specificity of perceptual learning
has been challenged by Xiao et al. (2008), who used a double-training paradigm that
employed training with a particular primary feature at one retinal location coupled
with additional training with an irrelevant feature/task at another location. They
found that this additional location training enabled a complete transfer of learning
of the primary feature to the second location. Perceptual learning has also been used
to improve vision in amblyopic patients, with a review by Levi and Li (2009) suggest-
ing that practising on a combination of different tasks and stimuli improves general
visual acuity. Generalization of skills acquired through perceptual learning methods
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was also recently demonstrated by Deveau et al. (2014), who managed to improve
the vision of baseball players with a combination of multiple perceptual learning
approaches.
As research continues, links between various types of learning become increasingly
clear. The unification of all learning under a common framework that is physiologic-
ally grounded and includes Bayesian inference as a component is an exciting prospect
and would be a major step towards understanding visual perception and applying
its principles in practice, for vision rehabilitation or enhancement. I intend to pursue
this line of research in the future.
7.3 conclusions
In this thesis, I have presented experimental and theoretical work suggesting that the
brain represents a prior probability on speed and that this prior, far from being innate
and fixed, can be changed by visual experience. Visual motion perception is viewed
here as a form of Bayesian inference, which is the process of combining sensory evid-
ence (likelihood) with expectations (prior). Moreover, this process is dynamic: the
prior is continually updated through exposure to environmental statistics. The data
from the experiment of Chapter 3 demonstrates a clear shift in direction perception
towards oblique directions in the course of the experiment. Furthermore, these per-
ceptual findings are naturally explained by a Bayesian model with a speed prior that
favours slow speeds progressively less. In Chapter 4, I provided a more accurate
characterization of the speed prior and showed that it varies considerably among
individuals. Along the way, I uncovered a novel interactive effect of contrast on per-
ceived speed, observing that contrast biases speed perception less at high speeds
than at low speeds when absolute contrast levels are low, whereas the opposite ef-
fect was seen at high contrast levels (contrast-induced biases are smaller at high
speeds). This interactive effect falls beyond the explanatory power of the presented
Bayesian models; however, I showed that a combination of a Bayesian model with a
biologically plausible model of speed tuning in visual cortex can account for these
effects. Interindividual variability in the speed prior was further explored in Chapter
5, where I presented preliminary evidence for a gender difference in the speed prior,
with females having priors that decrease more steeply with speed. Finally, Chapter 6
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presented evidence for the partial specificity of the learned speed prior and a related
phenomenon – its persistence in time. Both these phenomena are also seen in percep-
tual learning, hinting towards common mechanisms of apparently different types of
learning.
Overall, the present work supports the hypothesis that motion perception is a dy-
namic, adaptive process that combines past and present experience in a principled
way and is responsible both for the remarkable efficiency of human vision and for
certain motion illusions and biases. Not all experimental results in this thesis are
conclusive and whereas steps were taken towards answering important questions
regarding the mutability of the brain’s assumptions about motion perception, other
questions arose. It is hoped that the present work will stimulate further research to
address these matters through a combination of psychophysical and electrophysiolo-
gical/imaging experiments, thus bringing us one step closer towards understanding
how our visual world shapes and is shaped by our expectations and how these ex-
pectations are represented in the brain.
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8
A P P E N D I X
8.1 supplementary procedures of chapter 4
8.1.1 Derivation of Equation 17
The perceived speeds of the two gratings, v̂1 and v̂2 are normally distributed random
variables (Equations 13 and 14) and thus can be written as
v̂1 = v1 + a(v1)σ21 + σ
2
1 s1
v̂2 = v2 + a(v2)σ22 + σ
2
2 s2
where s1 and s2 are independent standard Gaussian random variables (∼ N (0, 1)). At
the PSE, v̂1 = v̂2 i.e. v2 = v1 + a(v1)σ21 − a(v2)σ22 + σ21 s1− σ22 s2. Thus v2 is a (weighted)
sum of independent normal random variables plus a constant and therefore it is itself
a normal random variable with mean v1 + a(v1)σ21 − a(v2)σ22 and variance σ21 + σ22 .
Since the logarithm of the prior is assumed locally linear in the model, a(v1) = a(v2)
and Equation 17 follows directly.
8.1.2 Model validation dataset
Following up to the present study, additional data was collected by Dan Berbec as
part of his Honours project under the supervision of Peggy Seriès (Berbec, 2013), with
the view to looking at different aspects of the topic of speed priors. This dataset con-
sists of a larger number of subjects (21) than the present dataset; however it includes
significantly fewer sessions (at most 6 staircases for each reference speed and contrast
condition) per subject, particularly in the conditions with the highest two reference
speeds (which show the greatest variability and thus require more data for an ac-
curate estimate of CDB). Although some experimental parameters, such as reference
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speeds, differ from this experiment and thus this dataset cannot be pooled with that
of the present study, it was useful for validating my method of fitting the Bayesian
model of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006).
8.1.3 PSE Variability
Here I derive a lower bound on the variance of the test speed v2 at the PSE. I first
note that the psychometric function (Equation 15) presented in Stocker and Simoncelli
(2006) can be simplified if I slightly rearrange the lhs as p(v̂2 − v̂1 > 0). Since v̂1 and
v̂2 are Gaussian variables, their difference is also Gaussian with mean µ2 − µ1 =
v2 + a(v2)σ22 − v1− a(v1)σ21 and variance σ21 + σ22 . Therefore p(v̂2 > v̂1) = p(v̂2− v̂1 >
0) = p(∆v̂ > 0) is the complement of a cumulative normal distribution









Therefore the Bayesian observer model is a type of probit analysis and thus I can use
standard theoretical (Finney, 1971) and simulation (McKee et al., 1985) results from
probit analysis. The simplest analytical formula for the standard error (SE) of the









2 is the slope of the psychometric function, n is the number of
trials at each stimulus level and w are the probit weights. As McKee et al. (1985)
point out, this is a variation of the common statistical formula s/
√
N used to estim-
ate the standard error of the mean. The similarity between the two formulas makes
intuitive sense if the staircase procedure is thought of as an estimator of the mean
of the underlying distribution of the test speed v2 at the PSE (Equation 17). In their
simulations, McKee et al. (1985) found that the SE of a staircase estimate for T75 (the
threshold at 75%) in a 2-AFC paradigm is approximately 3σ/
√
N (in the variable-
slope case) and also that the SE of T50 in a yes-no paradigm is approximately half of
that. Furthermore, they assert that under certain conditions of trial placement, these
are lower bounds for any possible staircase procedure. Since the staircase procedure
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This lower bound is tighter when the number of trials per staircase is relatively small,
typically less than 60 (McKee et al., 1985), such as in this experiment. My empirically
determined SE, whose square is given by Equation 19, is in broad agreement with
these results.
8.1.4 Derivation of Equation 20
The logarithm of the prior is assumed a locally linear function of speed (see Equation
10), that is
f (v) = ln p(v) = a(v)v + b
Thus, within a small range of speeds ∆v , the following holds:
f (v + ∆v) = f (v) + a(v)∆v
or
a(v) =
f (v + ∆v)− f (v)
∆v
(26)
Letting ∆v → 0, the right-hand side of Equation 26 is simply the derivative of f (v),
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and thus
p(v) = exp( f (v)) = exp(
∫
a(v)dv + C) = C′exp(
∫
a(v)dv)
where C′ = exp(C) plays the role of a normalizing constant, i.e. its value is such that∫ ∞
0 p(v)dv = 1.
8.2 supplementary figures of chapter 4
Figure 41: Mean ratio of speeds of the high (vHC) and low-contrast (vLC) gratings at the point
of subjective equality (PSE), plotted as a function of speed, separately for each
experimental session and contrast condition. Data from two subjects (S1 and S4)
who showed the greatest across-sessions variability. Error bars are std.dev.
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Figure 42: Raw psychometric data collected from the subject with the least decreasing speed
prior in Experiment 2 of Chapter 5 (Figure 24A). Rows represent contrast con-
ditions: in the top row, the contrasts of test and reference grating were 3% and
15%, respectively. Horizontal axis is speed of test grating (v2). Histograms show
the distribution of test speeds presented to the subject. Circles are proportion of
trials in which the the test grating is perceived faster than the reference grating
(p(v̂2 > v̂1)), i.e. they represent the subject’s psychometric function. Curves are
fits to the psychometric function: green and blue are Bayesian model fits using my
method and the method of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), respectively (see 4.3.1);
red are Weibull functions fit individually to each condition. Cf Supplementary Fig-
ure 1a-d in Stocker and Simoncelli (2006).















































































































































Figure 43: Raw psychometric data collected from the subject with the most decreasing speed
prior in Experiment 2 of Chapter 5 (Figure 24B). Rows represent contrast con-
ditions: in the top row, the contrasts of test and reference grating were 3% and
15%, respectively. Horizontal axis is speed of test grating (v2). Histograms show
the distribution of test speeds presented to the subject. Circles are proportion of
trials in which the the test grating is perceived faster than the reference grating
(p(v̂2 > v̂1)), i.e. they represent the subject’s psychometric function. Curves are
fits to the psychometric function: green and blue are Bayesian model fits using my
method and the method of Stocker and Simoncelli (2006), respectively (see 4.3.1);
red are Weibull functions fit individually to each condition. Cf Supplementary Fig-
ure 1a-d in Stocker and Simoncelli (2006).
